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Abstract: In voting theory, the Borda count’s tendency to produce a tie in an election varies

as a function of n, the number of voters, and m, the number of candidates. To better

understand this tendency, we embed all possible rankings of candidates in a hyperplane
sitting in m-dimensional space, to form an (m - 1)-dimensional polytope: the m-

permutahedron. The number of possible ties may then be determined computationally
using a special class of polynomials with modular coefficients. However, due to the

growing complexity of the system, this method has not yet been extended past the case of
m = 3. We examine the properties of certain voting situations for m ≥ 4 to better

understand an election’s tendency to produce a Borda tie between all candidates.

ii

Introduction
This paper covers a wide range of sub-topics in the field of social choice theory, with

the overarching goal of chronicling and expanding research into the properties of a voting
rule known as the Borda count. Specifically, our motivation is to count the number of
different ways an election will produce a tie between all candidates according to this
system. This problem is central to determining the Borda count's decisiveness, or

proclivity to produce an individual winner from an election instead of a tie. 1 Over the last

fifteen years, a great deal of research in this area has led to some useful results. However,

due to the computational complexity of the problem, most of this research has been limited
to the case of 3-candidate elections.

The paper is divided into 3 main sections. In Section I, we will provide general

background on voting theory, introduce the Borda count, and present some simple results
relevant to the problem of counting ties. In particular, we will discuss a geometric object

called the permutahedron, and explain how it is used to count the number of "Borda ties"

(i.e., ties using the Borda count as the voting rule) between all candidates, in a method first
discovered by Union College Professor William Zwicker in 2008 [3].

In Section II, we will review research on the problem of counting ties in 3-candidate

elections. The majority of this section focuses on two papers in particular, one by French

The term decisiveness often refers to a black and white condition: a voting rule satisfies
decisiveness if and only if it always produces a unique winner. A weaker version of decisiveness
has been defined as generic decisiveness, where a voting rule satisfies generic decisiveness if and
only if it nearly always produces a unique winner. Of course, this begs the question of what
constitutes "nearly always". For a comparison of these definitions, we refer the reader to [1]. Our
use of decisiveness, as a measure of how often a voting rule produces a tie, is more in the vein of
Cervone et al [2].
1
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economist Thierry Marchant, and the other by Steven Sam and Kevin Woods, professors at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Oberlin College, respectively [4 - 6].

Interestingly, both papers were themselves expansions of mathematical research done

mainly in the 1960s for a purpose entirely unrelated to voting theory. 2 Marchant used the
theory of random walks on special lattices, developed by Cyril Domb in 1960 for the study
of crystallography, to count 3-way Borda ties in 3-candidate elections as a function of the

number of voters in the electorate [7 ]. Sam and Woods, meanwhile, provided an

alternative proof of a theorem first proved by French mathematician Eugene Ehrhart in

1962 [8]. We will conclude Section II by reviewing Union College thesis student Rhongua

Dai's 2008 application of Ehrhart theory for counting Borda ties [9]. Dai's research came

after a 2008 paper by Lepelley, Louichi, and Smaoui, in which they made the first

connection between Ehrhart Theory and the problem of counting specific sets of ballots

cast in an election [10]. Drawing on Lepelley et al, and using a different set of assumptions
than Marchant (thus changing the problem), Dai used computer software to count the

number of 3-ways Borda ties in 3-candidate elections as a function of the number of voters.
We will begin Section III by giving a brief overview of the other half of Dai's thesis,

where he confirms his computer generated result with basic combinatorial methods. We
will then present our own research into the problem of counting Borda ties. Since Dai's

Ehrhart Theory approach for more than 3 candidates was impeded by the limitations of
computing power, our research expands on his combinatorial methods. In essence, we
have used the permutahedron to begin to classify and understand the relationships

Sam and Woods do not work on voting theory either; however, we believe their new proof of
Ehrhart's seminal theorem to be quite useful for anyone attempting to understand why functions
that count ties in the Borda Count take the form that they do.
2
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between different collections of ballots that produce an "all-way" tie when cast in an

election. We conclude Section III by presenting the results from a computer program that
we have written to aid us in our classification efforts.

While a great deal of work has been done in the pursuit of determining the

decisiveness of the Borda count, there is still much that remains, particularly for elections
with 4 or more candidates. As we will see, research related to this problem spans various
topics in discrete mathematics, abstract and linear algebra, and affine geometry, to name

just a few relevant fields. Therefore, just as recent efforts to count Borda ties have drawn
on initially unrelated work, it is quite possible that future research in this direction will
open doors outside of social choice theory in exciting and unforeseen ways.

3

Section I:
The Borda Count, Permutahedra, and Central Voting Situations
1.0 Introduction to the Borda count
Historically, methods for choosing the winner of an election have varied from

society to society. The best-known method for a two-candidate election is Majority Rule

voting, wherein each member of an electorate casts one vote for a preferred candidate. Of
course, the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins the election. In 1952,

American mathematician Kenneth May demonstrated that Majority Rule is the only method

for determining the winner of a two-candidate election that meets a specific set of desirable
criteria 3 [11]. Examples of Majority Rule voting systems abound. For instance, most U.S.

states use Majority Rule to determine which presidential candidate will be awarded that
state's total number of electoral votes.

For elections consisting of three or more candidates, the choice of voting rule

(formally defined in Section 1.3) is less clear. Different rules obey different sets of

desirable and undesirable properties, and in 1951, American economist Kenneth Arrow
showed that there is no one 'perfect' voting rule for an election between three or more

candidates, i.e., no such voting rule could possess every desirable property 4 [12]. Our

While we do not delve into detail here, the conditions that hold for Majority Rule in two-candidate
elections are anonymity, neutrality, and positive responsiveness. Formal definitions and May's
original proof of his theorem may be found in [11].
4 Again, we do not define these properties here, but they include Pareto efficiency, non-dictatorship,
and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), in addition to some other conditions [12].
3
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paper is concerned with certain properties of the Borda count, a rule proposed by French
political scientist and mathematician Jean-Charles De Borda in 1770. The Borda count is
currently used by various political and private organizations. 5

We will now define the Borda count. Let A = {a1, a2, . . ., am} be a finite set of

alternatives (or candidates); let V = {v1, v2, ..., vn} be a finite set of voters; let a ranking σ be a

strict linear ordering of the alternatives; and let L(A) be the set of all rankings. Since |A| =

m, then there are m! possible rankings, so |L(A)| = m!. In the Borda count, each voter casts
a ballot that corresponds to one of the m! rankings, rather than voting for a single

alternative. The first-place alternative in a single voter’s ballot is assigned m - 1 points, the
second-place alternative is assigned m - 2 points, and so on, until the last-place alternative
receives 0 points.

For instance, consider the three-candidate case where A = {p, q, r}. Then there are

3! (so 6) possible rankings in L(A). For each ballot cast in the election, 2 points are

awarded to the first-choice candidate on the ballot's ranking, 1 point to the second-choice
candidate, and no points to the candidate lowest on the ranking.

The winner(s) or social choice(s) of the election is/are the alternative(s) with a

greatest sum of points over all voters at the end of voting. In some instances, the Borda

count may result in a tie in the election.

The National Assembly of Slovenia uses the Borda Count to elect two ethnic minority (Italian and
Hungarian) members and the Associated Press uses the Borda Count to rank American college
(NCAA) athletes, to name just a few current uses [13-14]. Interestingly, the Borda Count dates back
far before Jean-Charles De Borda described it in the 18th century: the Roman Senate used the Borda
Count as a voting method as early as 105 AD [15].
5
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1.1 Independent Culture and Independent Anonymous Culture
A profile reflects all ballots cast in some election, and it is convention to represent a

profile by listing each ballot below a corresponding voter in column form. 6 For example,
consider the election with three candidates (A = {p, q, r}) and four voters (V = {v1, v2, v3,

v4}), where v1 and v2 both cast ballots for the ranking with p first, q second, and r third

(denoted p > q > r ) , v3 casts a ballot for q > r > p, and v4 casts a ballot for r > p > q. This

profile may then be written as

v1
p
q
r

v2
p
q
r

v3
q
r
p

v4
r
p
q

According to the Borda count, in the above profile, p receives 5 points (2 each from v1 and

v2, 0 from v3, and 1 from v4); similarly, q receives 4 points and r receives 3 points. Thus p is
the winner.

An anonymous profile or voting situation is an m!-tuple
∏ = (n1 , n2 , … , nm! )

of non-negative integers satisfying n = ∑m!
j=1 nj , where n is the number of voters in the

electorate. For the case of three alternatives, we interpret each nj as the number of voters

who cast the jth ballot in the following list:

More formally, a profile may be defined as a function P: N→L(A), i.e., as a function that assigns a
voter to a ranking in L(A). We say P ∈ L(A)N.
6
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

p>q>r
p>r>q
q>p>r
q>r>p
r>p>q
r>q>p

⊛

Note that for our purposes, the choice of how to index the rankings is largely arbitrary. In

⊛, we listed them by lexicographic order, where rankings are positioned according to their
linear ordering in a dictionary. By way of example, the voting situation corresponding to
the previous profile would be

∏ = (2, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0).

A voting situation may also be displayed in the same form as a profile, with number of

voters, rather than the name of a voter, listed above a given ranking. We think of a voting
situation as corresponding to a profile where we are not interested in which voters cast a
given ballot. In other words, we treat two profiles as the same voting situation if voters
simply swap ballots.

The probability of there being a tie in the Borda count depends on whether we are

counting profiles or voting situations, as this probability can be expressed as either the

number of profiles that produce ties over the number of possible profiles, or as the number
of voting situations that produce ties over the number of possible voting situations. There
are two main assumptions relevant to the problem of counting Borda ties, and which

assumption we choose corresponds to our choice between counting voting situations and
counting profiles [16]. If we assume Independent Culture (IC), then we assume that each

profile is equally likely to occur. Since there are n ballots in a profile (one for each voter)
7

and m! possible rankings for a ballot, the probability of seeing a given profile is always
1

n

1 4

�m!� . For example, the probability of observing any m =3, n = 4 profile is just �6� =

or approximately 0.08%.

1

In Independent Anonymous Culture (IAC), we assume that each possible voting

situation is equally likely to occur. Thus in order to find the probability of observing a

specific voting situation, we must count the number of total voting situations for m

candidates and n voters. We do this using the following well-known combinatorial

theorem.

Theorem 1.1. Consider all r-tuples (a1 , a2 , … , ar ) such that a1 , a2 , … , ar ∈ ℤ≥0 and
∑ri=0 ai = b. Then there exists �b+r−1
� distinct r-tuples.
r−1

Proof: Since each ai is nonnegative, we can replace each ai by a sequence of ai 1s (which
means no 1s at all in the case of ai = 0). In this form, there are now ∑ri=0 ai 1s, or b 1s,

separated by r - 1 commas. We see that the placement of the commas now determines the

value of each ai when we convert the tuple back to its original form. An example of this is
shown in Figure 1 below. Thus there are (b + r - 1) objects (1s + commas), and we can

form any r-tuple (the original form) by choosing the position of the r - 1 commas. Thus,
there are �b+r−1
� possible r-tuples, as desired. ∎
r−1

∏ = (1 1, , , 1 , 1, ) = (2, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0)

Figure 1. An example of the entries of 1's and commas that correspond
to the voting situation from our earlier example.
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Applying Theorem 1.1 and our definition of a voting situation, we see that the total

number of voting situations in an election with m candidates and n voters is simply

−1
�n+m!
�. Therefore, if we assume IAC, the probability of a given voting situation occurring
m! −1

is

�

(5!)(4!)
9!

1

(n + m! − 1)!
�
�(m! − 1)!�(n + m! − 1 − (m! − 1))!

=

�

1

(n + m! − 1)!
�
�(m! − 1)!�(n!)

=

�(m! − 1)!�(n!)
.
(n + m! − 1)!

For example, the IAC-probability for seeing a given m = 4, n = 4 voting situation is

=

1

126

, or 0.79%.

As we will see, the probability that an election will produce a Borda tie is different

depending on whether we assume IC or IAC for our probability distribution (a simple

demonstration of this difference can be done for the case of m = 3 and n = 2). With the

exception of Sections 2.0 and 2.1, the remainder of the paper will be concerned with IAC,
and therefore the problem of counting voting situations.

1.2 Permutahedra and the Borda count

In order to geometrically interpret the Borda count, we now assume that every

finite set A of alternatives comes equipped with a single, fixed reference enumeration,

where we take the reference enumeration of {a1, a2, . . ., am} to be the linear ordering a1 > a2

> . . . > am. We denote the reference enumeration of A = {a1, a2, . . ., am} as Ar = <a1, a2, . . .,
am>. For ai and aj as any two candidates in Ar, we write ai >σ aj if the ranking σ ranks

alternative ai above aj. For a given ranking σ, the rank ρ(aj) is the number of alternatives ak
9

in Ar satisfying aj >σ ak, and a rank vector ρ(σ) is the m-tuple (ρ(a1), ρ(a2), . . ., ρ(am) ),
listing ranks in reference enumeration order.

As an example for the lexicographic reference enumeration <p, q, r> of three

alternatives, consider the 3rd ranking, q > p > r, taken from our list ⊛ . Then the rank ρ(p) =

1, since alternative p is only ranked above one other alternative, r. It follows that the rank

vector ρ(3) for the 3rd ranking is (1, 2, 0), as ρ(p) = 1, ρ(q) = 2, and ρ(r) = 0. Note how ρ(3)
corresponds to how many points p, q, and r receive, respectively, from a single ballot cast
for the 3rd ranking.

From a geometric perspective, the function ρ assigns each ranking to a point in ℝm.

These points are the vertices of the m-permutahedron, an (m – 1)-dimensional polytope

(see Section 2.5 for definition of dimension and polytope) living in ℝm with edges between

points that differ only in the reversal of a single pair of alternatives. As seen in Figure 2, the

3-permutahedron is a regular hexagon in ℝ3. Recently, Zwicker showed that the Borda
count has an equivalent geometric form, called the Permuta-mean rule, whereby the

winner of the election is the candidate atop the ranking on the permutahedron closest to

the mean of all rank vectors of cast ballots (counting multiplicity) in the election [3]. Thus,

an m-way tie corresponds to the mean point existing at the center of the permutahedron.

10

6: r > q > p
ρ(6)=(0,1,2)

5: r > p > q
ρ(5)=(1,0,2)

4: q > r > p
ρ(4)=(0,2,1)

2: p > r > q
ρ(2)=(2,0,1)
1: p > q > r
ρ(1)=(2,1,0)

3: q > p > r
ρ(3)=(1,2,0)

Figure 2. The 3-permutahedron is a regular hexagon centered at the
point (1,1,1).

It should be noted that traditionally, the m-permutahedron has vertices that are

permutations of the set {1, 2, . . . , m}, not {0, 1, . . ., m - 1}, and lives in the hyperplane x1 + x2

+ … + xm = ∑𝑚−1
𝑖=0 𝑚 − 𝑖 . We use our version of the m-permutahedron to correspond to our

definition of the Borda count. However, we observe that our definition of the Borda count

is equivalent to a version that assigns scoring weights (introduced in Section 1.3) from m

down to 1, rather than m - 1 down to 0. We will also discuss other variations of the Borda

count in Section 1.3.

Although the 4-permutahedron lives in ℝ4, it can still be visualized as a 3-

dimensional polytope, the truncated octahedron. This is shown in Figure 3.

11

Figure 3. The 4-permutahedron is a truncated octahedron [2].

The 4-permutahedron has 14 faces (8 regular hexagonal and 6 square), 24 vertices,

and 36 edges. The myriad symmetries in the truncated octahedron are central to the
problem of counting the number of ways candidates can tie in the Borda count.
1.3 The origin-centered Borda count

Before we begin our discussion of counting ties, it is necessary to take a step back

and briefly discuss how the Borda count fits into the bigger picture of methods used to

determine election outcomes. First, we define a voting rule. For a finite set A of m

alternatives and a finite set V of n voters, a social choice correspondence (or voting rule) is a
function that assigns to each profile or voting situation in L(A)N a non-empty set of

alternatives containing the winner(s) or social choice(s). The Borda count belongs to a

particular set of voting rules called scoring rules, which can be defined in the following way:
Choose a vector w = 〈w1 , w2 , … , wm 〉 of real-number scoring weights, satisfying w1 ≥

w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wm. Each voter awards w1 points to a top choice, w2 points to a second choice,
etc. The winner is the alternative(s) with the greatest point total (sum of points over all
voters).

12

Thus, in Section 1.0, we defined the Borda count as a scoring rule where the scoring

weights are set as w1 = m - 1, w2 = m - 2, . . . , wm= 0. However, it is possible to adjust the

scoring weights to obtain a scoring rule equivalent to this version of the Borda count. In

general, we can prove that a scoring rule is equivalent to the Borda count as defined above
iff it its scoring vector is a positive affine transform (see Section 2.3) of the scoring vector
defined above. In other words, any scoring rule with evenly-spaced weights that are

strictly decreasing yields the Borda count. One common version of the Borda count is a

scoring rule with the scoring weights decreasing from m to 1 rather than from m - 1 to 0.
However, we are interested in another version of the Borda count, which we'll call the

origin-centered (o-c) Borda count. The o-c Borda count for m alternatives is the scoring
rule with the vector of scoring weights 〈wi 〉 defined as follows:

(a)

(b)

〈wi 〉 = 〈2(j − i) + 1〉m
i=1 where m = 2j for some j ∈ ℤ>0

〈wi 〉 = 〈(j − i) + 1〉m
i=1 where m = 2j + 1 for some j ∈ ℤ≥0

As an example, in a three-candidate election, m = 2j + 1with j = 1, so that the

candidate in first place on a voter’s ballot receives (1 – 1) + 1 = 1 point, the second-place

candidate receives (1 – 2) + 1 = 0 points, and the candidate in last place receives (1 – 3) + 1
= -1 point. For four candidates, m = 2j with j = 2, so that first place receives 3 points,

second place receives 1 point, third place receives -1 point, and last place receives -3
points.

At first glance, it may seem that the only real advantage from using the o-c Borda

count is the more natural position of the m-permutahedron, which is now centered at the
origin. However, because of the equivalency between the Borda count and the Permuta13

mean rule, the o-c Borda count also makes for greater combinatorial simplicity when it

comes to counting the number of possible m-way ties for a given number of voters, as we

will see later in Section 2.8.

1.4 Central voting situations and m-way ties in the Borda count.
Our motivation for counting m-way ties is relevant to the broader interests of

studying voting theory. Among the properties a society might consider when selecting a

voting rule is that rule’s propensity to produce a unique winner [1]. A rule that is likelier to
yield an m-way tie, i.e., a less decisive rule, is therefore less likely to produce a unique
winner. While this occurrence may seem rare, and not worth considering for a large

number of voters, it is certainly relevant when the number of voters is small. For instance,
assuming IAC for three alternatives and two voters, there are 3 different voting situations
that will produce a 3-way tie in the Borda count, corresponding to an
probability that the system will produce a 3-way tie.

1
7

(or 14.3%)

For m alternatives and n voters, a central voting situation is a voting situation

∏ = (n1 , n2 , . . , nm! ) that produces an m-way tie in the Borda count. 7

Proposition 1.4.1. For m alternatives and n voters, a voting situation ∏ = (n1 , n2 , . . , nm! )
is central iff the (not necessarily distinct) rank vectors ρ(1), ρ(2), . . ., ρ(m!), corresponding
to cast ballots in a list, satisfy the following criterion:

We note that this definition of central is different than the one used by Cervone et al [2] and Dai
[9], although in both papers, the conditions for centrality are proven to be equivalent to our
definition for the case of 3 alternatives.
7

14

m!

� nk 𝛒( k) =

k=1

n
�W
��⃑
m

��⃑ is the constant m-tuple of values corresponding to the sum W of the scoring
where �W
weights wi.

Thus for the standard definition of the Borda count, W = ∑m
i=1 m − i, while for the o-

m
c Borda count, W = ∑m
i=1 2(j − i) + 1 for m = 2j, and W = ∑i=1(j − i) + 1 for m = 2j + 1.

Proof of Proposition 1.4.1:

(⇐): Let AR = <a1, a2, . . ., am> be a reference enumeration of m alternatives, and for an

arbitrary voting situation ∏ = (n1 , n2 , . . , nm! ) with n voters, let s(ai) denote the Borda

score of alternative ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Let ρ(k) denote the rank vector corresponding to the
ranking on the kth ballot in a specified list. Now assume
m!

� nk 𝛒( k) =

k=1

n
���⃑
W
m

n

��⃑ is constant, meaning
Thus the sum of rank vectors is constant over all entries, since m �W
that s(a1) = s(a2) = . . . = s(am). Thus there is an m-way Borda tie, so ∏ is central, as
desired.

(⇒): Assume ∏ is central. Let σ be any ranking with rank vector ρ(σ). Then the sum of the

ranks ρ(ai) (for 1 ≤ i ≤ m) in the rank vector ρ(σ) is
m

m

i=1

i=1

� ρ(ai ) = � wi .
15

Since there are n rank vectors (corresponding to a single vote for each of n voters), then the

sum of Borda scores over all candidates is

m

n � wi ,
i=1

which is just

m

� s(ai ).
i=1

But s(a1) = s(a2) = . . . = s(am) by our centrality assumption. So then
m

m

i=1

i=1

� s(ai ) = m ∗ s(ai ) = n � wi
Thus we may conclude that

m

n
s(ai ) = � wi .
m
i=1

Since each alternative receives a total Borda score of
rank vectors is

m!

� nk 𝛒( k) =

k=1

n

m

∑m
i=1 wi , it follows that the sum of all

n
���⃑. ∎
W
m

Corollary 1.4.2. In the o-c Borda count for m alternatives and n voters, a profile

∏ = (n1 , n2 , . . , nm! ) is central iff the (not necessarily distinct) rank vectors ρ(1), ρ(2), . . .,
ρ(m!), corresponding to cast ballots in a list, satisfy the following criterion:
16

m!

� nk 𝛒( k) = �⃑
0
k=1

Proof of Corollary 1.4.2:
For the o-c Borda count, either
m

W = � 2(j − i) + 1 , where m = 2j for some j ∈ ℤ>0 , or
i=1
m

W = �(j − i) + 1 , where m = 2j + 1 for some j ∈ ℤ≥0 .
i=1

In either case, we can show that W = 0. The corollary follows. ∎

Theorem 1.4.3. For m = 2j (j=1, 2, 3, . . .) alternatives and n voters, if a voting situation is
central, then n = 2k (k = 1, 2, 3, . . .). ("A voting situation for an even number of

alternatives can only produce an m-way Borda tie if there is an even number of voters.")

Proof of Theorem 1.4.3:

Let AR = <a1, a2, . . ., am> be a reference enumeration of m alternatives such that m = 2j for

some j ∈ ℤ>0, and let ∏ = (n1 , n2 , . . , nm! ) be a central voting situation with n voters. Take

any alternative ak in A. Let s(ak) be ak's o-c Borda score and let ri denote the number of
votes for ballots where ak is ranked ith for 0 ≤ i ≤ m. Then
m

� ri = n
i=1

Now, we know ∏ is central iff s(ak) = 0, by Corollary 1.4.2. So then
17

m

� ri wi = s(ak ) = 0,
i=1

where wi = 2(j − i) + 1 and m = 2j for some j ∈ ℤ>0. Subtracting, we compute
m

m

i=1

i=1

� ri − � ri wi = n
m

� ri �1 − (2j − 2i + 1)� = n
i=1

m

2 � ri (i − j) = n
i=1

So then

m

n
� ri (i − j) = .
2
i=1

But we see that n/2 must be an integer, so we conclude that n is in fact even, as desired. ∎

A version of this proof by Marchant, as pertains to profiles in IC, may be found in [4].

18

Section II:
Using Lattices to Count Ties: Random Walks and Ehrhart Theory
2.0 Counting m-way ties in the Borda count in different "cultures"
The problem of counting m-way ties in the Borda count is not new. Over the past

fifteen years, research in this field has followed two different paths: one for counting
profiles under IC assumptions, and one for counting voting situations under IAC

assumptions. In 2001, French economist Thierry Marchant corrected a forty-year-old

formula used to explain the magnetic properties of crystals with random lattices walks and
applied it to count the number of profiles that produce 3-way Borda ties between 3

candidates as a function of n voters [4]. He then used lattice Green's functions to derive an

approximate expression for 3-way ties as a function of n voters and compared values given
by this expression to numerical results. More recently, Union College Professor William
Zwicker, thesis student Ronghua Dai, and others used the Ehrhart Theory of quasi-

polynomials and computer software to find the number of voting situations producing a 3-

way tie between three candidates as a function of the number n of voters [2, 9]. They
confirmed their result with brute force combinatorial methods. We now review and

discuss both research into counting profiles and research into counting voting situations,
and present a proof of Ehrhart's famous theorem.

2.1 Counting profiles: random walks and Green's functions
In 2001, Marchant [4 - 5] used existing literature on the magnetic properties of

crystals to study the IC-probability that a 3-candidate profile would produce a 3-way tie in
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an election. Marchant’s results corrected and expanded previous work by C. Domb some
four decades earlier [7].

In the context of crystallography, a lattice can take on a variety of structures,

including triangular structure, as seen below in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Triangular lattice [4].

A cycle in the above lattice is a path or “walk” that begins at a given start node x,

travels along any number l of (not necessarily distinct) edges, and returns to the same
node. For instance, the shortest cycle of non-zero length has length l = 2, when a cycle

travels one edge away from x and then returns; and it easy to see that for a fixed x, the

number r2 of possible cycles for l = 2 is 6. In a cycle where l =3, the path is around a single

triangle in the lattice, and r3= 12 (there are six triangles surrounding each node, and each
triangle can be travelled in two directions). In 1960, Domb claimed to find a general

expression for rl, that is, the number of possible cycles of length l for a given node on the

triangular lattice, and he published his findings along with numerical values for 2 ≤ l ≤ 9.

While his numerical results were correct, his published formula was flawed due to a

multiplicative factor that was lost in the typing process [5]. After communicating with

Domb, Marchant published the correct expression and showed how it could be used to
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count the number of profiles producing m-way ties in the Borda count, where l = n, the
number of voters in the election.

Although we do not go into detail here, the relationship between counting 3-way

Borda ties and cycles on the triangular lattice is related to our notion of rank vectors and

the permuta-mean rule. Notice that any collection of 6 triangles centered around a node x
on the lattice in Figure 4 forms a regular hexagon (think: 3-permutahedron), and a line
between x and an adjacent node corresponds to one of the six rank vectors. Therefore,

taking a step between adjacent nodes on the lattice corresponds to a single ballot cast in
the election. In the same way that the Permuta-mean rule says that the mean of rank

vectors in an election is at the center of the m-permutahedron if and only if there is an mway tie, a path on the lattice will end back at the start node x in the center of 6 triangles

forming a hexagon (think: center of the 3-permutahedron) if and only if there is a 3-way tie.
We will now present Marchant's main results and point the reader to [4 - 5] for the
derivation.

Theorem 2.1.1 [Domb and Marchant]. For 3 candidates and n voters, the number of
profiles that produce a 3-way Borda tie is
rn = �
s,t

n!
� 2s−q
s! t!
q

(t + q)!

2 q! (s

t+q
�� 2 � !�

1
,
− q)!

where s, t = 0, 1, . . ., n; 2s + t = n; and 0 ≤ q ≤ s with (t + q) even. Since there are (m!)n ways

to form a profile under IC assumptions for an election with m candidates and n voters, the
above theorem leads to the following corollary.
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Corollary 2.1.2 [Marchant]. For 3 candidates and n voters, the probability that a profile
produces a 3-way Borda tie is

P3−way tie,m=3 (n) =

1
n!
�
� 2s−q
n
6
s! t!
s,t

q

(t + q)!

2 q! (s

t+q
�� 2 � !�

1
,
− q)!

where s, t = 0, 1, . . ., n; 2s + t = n; and 0 ≤ q ≤ s with (t + q) even. As a simple example, let's
consider a 3-candidate election with n = 3 voters. Then according to our constraints, we
must have, t = 0, 1, 2, 3 with 2s + t = 3 and t + q even. The only combination of s, t, and q
where these conditions hold is: s = 1, t = 1, q = 1. So we compute
P3−way tie,m=3 (3) = �

1
6
2 1
1
� �20 2
�=
, or 5.55%
216 (1)(1)
1 (1)(1)
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In contrast, there are 2 voting situations with 3 voters and 3 candidates that result in a 3-

way Borda tie (see Section 3.0 below), so the probability that a voting situation where m, n
=3 results in a 3-way Borda tie is
2

�(m! − 1)!�(n!)
(120)(6)
1
= 2
=
, or 3.57%
(n + m! − 1)!
40320
28

Shown below are some of Marchant's numerical results, which he obtained from

Corollary 3.2, where we have multiplied by 6n to obtain corresponding approximate rn

values (representing the total number of profiles with n number of voters that result in a 3way Borda tie).
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n

1

2

3

4

5

6

rn

0

6

12

90

360

2040

P3-way tie, m = 3(n)

0

0.167 0.056 0.069 0.046 0.044

7

8

9

10080 54800 290640 --0.036

0.033

Table 1. Approximate numerical results from Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 [4].

0.029

As seen above in Table 1, the probability that a profile produces a 3-way Borda tie

does not decrease steadily as a function of voters. In fact, the probability increases from

three to four voters, before decreasing in non-constant intervals for 4 ≤ n ≤ 9. However, for

n ≥ 10, the probability of an m-way tie will decrease asymptotically as it approaches zero in
the limit as n approaches infinity. This may be seen in Appendix I, where we show results

from Marchant's Monte-Carlo simulations for up to 10 candidates and up to 100 voters. A
function that approximates this asymptotic behavior well for n ≥ 10 can also be derived
using lattice Green's functions. We will now present the basic concepts behind this
derivation. Since our analysis is only an outline, we direct the interested reader to

Marchant's primary reference on random walks [17] and two other helpful resources [18 19].

Choose any starting node x on a d-dimensional lattice and let l be a d-dimensional

vector. Now let Pn(l) denote the probability that a random walk of n steps (where a step

can be of any length) from x will conclude at the end point of the vector (relative to x). It is
convention that we may refer to this end node as l although we have already defined l as

the vector itself. From any node l' on the lattice, the probability that a single step move will
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∞

0

result at l is denoted p(l - l'). Therefore, the probability that a walk starting at x and ending
at l in n + 1 steps is given by the simple recurrence relation:

Pn+1 (𝒍) = � p�𝒍 − 𝒍′ �Pn �𝒍′ �,
𝑙′

Equation 2.1.4

where the sum is taken over all nodes l' of the lattice. Since the above relation holds

regardless of how we choose our starting point x (a property known as translational
invariance), the above form can be reduced to a discrete convolution:
Pn+1 (𝒍) = p�𝒍 − 𝒍′ � ∗ Pn �𝒍′ �,

Equation 2.1.5

where ∗ denotes the convolution and we note that Pn(l') is itself a convolution.

Furthermore, Pn+1(l) may be written in terms of the probabilities of reaching each node on

steps along the way to l, i.e.,

Pn+1 (𝑙) = p1 ∗ p2 ∗ . . . ∗ pn ∗ pn+1 ∗ P0 ,
′

Eq uation 2.1.6

where we set P0 = δ(x) = � 1 for 𝒍 = 𝒙 to denote that our starting point is at x.
0 otherwise

In order to simplify Equation 2.1.6, we must introduce the discrete Fourier

transform (DFT). For a given sequence of N complex numbers X={x0, x1, . . ., xN-1}, the DFT
of X is the N-periodic sequence of complex numbers, whose kth entry is given as:
N−1

x� k = � xn ⋅ e−i2πkn/N .
n=0
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Now, according to the convolution theorem (the formal statement and proof of which may

be found in [18]), the Fourier transform of a convolution of two functions is the product of
the Fourier transforms of each function. Thus, Equation 2.1.6 may be written as
n+1

�n+1 (𝒌) = p� 1 p� 2 . . . p� n+1 = � p� i ,
P
i=1

Equation 2.1.7

where we have changed l to k since the domain of our function has changed after the DFT.
At this point, we can introduce what is known as the 'structure function,' which describes
the DFT of the probability function p for an individual step on a given lattice. For the
triangular lattice shown in Figure 4, the structure function is given as
𝜆(𝒌) =

1
(cos𝑘1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑘2 + cos(𝑘1 + 𝑘2 ).
3

Equation 2.1.8

We can now invert the DFTs in Equation 2.1.6 and use Pn+1(l) to obtain the generating
function,

∞

P(𝒍, ξ) = � Pi (𝒍)ξi =
i=0

1
e−i𝒍⋅𝒌 dd 𝒌
�
.
.
.
�
,
(2π)d
1 − ξ𝜆(𝒌)
𝐵

Equation 2.1.9

where d is the dimension of the lattice (2 in this case) and B = [-π, π]d is called the first

Brillouin zone. The function on the right in Equation 2.1.9 is called the Green's function of

our lattice, or the lattice Green's function (LGF). Setting l equal to the 0 vector to limit the

above function to the probability that our path is a cycle, Zumofen and Blumen [20] showed
that we can substitute our structure function (Equation 2.1.7) into the LGF to get
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P(𝟎, ξ) =
where a =

3
ξ

6

6

πξ√a + 1√b − 1

+ 1 − �3 + ξ , b =

3
ξ

𝐾 ��

2(b − a)
�,
(a + 1)(b − 1)

Equation 2.1.10

6

+ 1 + �3 + ξ, and K is itself a function known as the

complete elliptic integral of the first kind. For the right conditions of ξ (specifically, ξ ≈ 1),
we can expand Equation 2.1.10 and substitute back into the left side of the equality in
Equation 2.1.9 to see that, for n sufficiently close to infinity,
Pn+1 (𝟎) ≈

√3
.
2πn

Thus, this expression explains the asymptotic behavior of P as a function of n, and as

demonstrated in Appendix I, actually fits the Monte Carlo results for n ≥ 10 fairly well.

Marchant attempted to use the above method to derive LGF's and approximate probability
functions for elections with 4 or more candidates, where one can imagine that the 2dimensional triangular lattice would become a 3-dimensional lattice with truncated

octahedrons divided into 12 subsections with a node at the center. In the end, Marchant
was unable to integrate the LGF for more than three alternatives [4].

2.2 Counting voting situations: an introduction to Ehrhart theory
Whereas random walks and lattice Green's functions have proved most useful for

finding the probability of a 3-way Borda tie assuming IC, French mathematician Eugene

Ehrhart's theory of quasi-polynomials (polynomials with periodic coefficients) has done
equally well assuming IAC. Developed in the 1960s, Ehrhart theory is used to count the
number of integer lattice points contained within a region in Euclidean space called a
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polytope, when the polytope is dilated by an integer factor, i.e., when every element of the
polytope is multiplied by an integer [8]. However, the utility of Ehrhart polynomials for
voting theory was only realized in 2008, when Lepelley, Louichi, and Smaoui published

some initial results on the Borda count and Plurality voting [10]. In essence, a region in

space can be parameterized with linear constraints such that the integer points within the

region represent specific voting situations. Hence the applicability of Ehrhart theory, with

the dilation factor becoming the number of voters in the electorate. This connection paved

the way to further research. Later in 2008, Union College thesis student Ronghua Dai used

Ehrhart theory to find an expression for the number of 2 and 3-way Borda ties as a function
of n number of voters in the case of 3 alternatives [9]. We now discuss the basics of
Ehrhart theory and present Dai's results.
2.3 Introduction to affine geometry I

In order to properly understand Ehrhart Theory, we must first introduce some basic

definitions from affine geometry. Let S be a subset of Euclidean space and take any s1, s2, . .

., sk in S. Let λ1, λ2, . . . , λk be any nonnegative real numbers such that ∑ki=1 λi = 1. Then S is

convex if ∑ki=1 λi si ∈ S always holds. 8 Geometrically, S is convex if for any two points si and
sj in S, all of the points on the straight line between si and sj are also in S. For example, in
Figure 5, the set A is convex while the set B is not.

It is sufficient to define convexity for k = 2, but this more general statement follows as a
consequence.
8
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A

B

Figure 5. For the above sets A and B living in an arbitrary plane, A is
convex while B is not, as evidenced by the red line connecting two
points in B, where part of the line is outside B.

Next, let X = {x1, x2, x3, . . .} be a set of points in Euclidean space. Then the convex hull

of X, denoted CH(X), is the (unique) minimal convex set containing X. Equivalently,
CH(X) = �� αi xi � ∀i: αi ∈ ℝ, αi ≥ 0 and � αi = 1�.
i

i

By way of example, let X be the set of three points in an arbitrary plane shown in Figure 6.
Then the set C = CH(X), while D ≠ CH(X), although it is still convex.
C

D

Figure 6. Left: C is the convex hull of the 3 points in X. Right: D is
convex, but D ≠ CH(X).

The definition for the affine hull of X, denoted Aff(X), is the same as the definition for

CH(X), except that the αi scalar coefficients may be negative.

Aff(X) = �� αi xi � ∀i: αi ∈ ℝ and � αi = 1�.
i

i
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Geometrically, this means that the affine hull of two points is the line going through the

points; the affine hull of three non-collinear points is the plane containing the points; and
the affine hull of four points in ℝ3, not lying in the same plane, is all of ℝ3.

An affine transform is a function f: ℝ → ℝ of the form x ↦ ax + b where a and b are

real constants, and a positive affine transform adds the restriction a > 0.
2.4 Pick's Theorem

A convex lattice polygon P is a convex polygon in ℝ2 whose corners are integer

lattice points. We define nP = {na | a ∈ P}, where n is a positive integer called the dilation

factor, and we say nP is the polygon P dilated by a factor of n. Let A(P) denote the area of P
with dilation factor of 1 (i.e., no dilation), let B(P) denote the number of lattice points on

the boundary of P (also not dilated), and let Lp(n) denote the total number of lattice points
in nP (including boundary points). By way of example, consider the following convex
polygon "P5" in ℝ2 with different dilation factors.

Figure 7. Convex lattice polygon in ℝ2 dilated by factors of 1 ≤ n ≤ 4 [21].
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Taking the above lattice to be the first quadrant of ℝ2 with x and y as the horizontal

and vertical axes, respectively, we may define P5 with the following system of linear

equations:

𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑦 ≥ 0
𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 + 2
1
𝑦 ≤ − 𝑥 + 3.5
2
𝑦 ≥ 2𝑥 − 3

Note that this may be written more simply in matrix form as:
−1 0
0
⎡ 0 −1⎤
⎡0⎤
⎢
⎥ 𝑥
⎢−1 1 ⎥ � � ≤ ⎢⎢ 2 ⎥⎥
⎢1
⎥ 𝑦
⎢3.5⎥
1
⎢2
⎥
⎣3⎦
⎣ 2 −1⎦

Now, as seen in Figure 7, P5 is a pentagonal convex lattice polygon with area A(P5)

that we may find by separately considering the two lattice triangles (one on top and one on
the right side) and the lattice square. Summing these three parts, we get A(P5) = A⧠ +

A⧍upper + A⧍side = 4 + 1.5 + 1 = 6.5. By inspection, we also see that the number of lattice

points on the boundary of P5 is B(P5) = 7 and the number of total lattice points including
the boundary is LP5(1) = 11.
result:

In 1889, Austrian mathematician George Alexander Pick formulated the following
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Pick’s Theorem 9 (or Ehrhart's Theorem for ℝ2, integer vertices). Let P be a convex lattice
polygon, n ϵ ℕ. Then

Lp (n) = A(P) n2 +

B(P)
2

n + 1.

We omit a proof of Pick's Theorem here, but direct the reader to [23]. Returning to

the example of the pentagonal convex lattice polygon from Figure 5, we can now solve for
the number of lattice points for the largest shown dilation of 4P5 as follows:
Lp5 (4) = (6.5) 42 +

7
2

(4) + 1 = 119.

More generally, we get the following quadratic polynomial for the number of lattice points
as a function of n dilations:

Lp5 (n) = 6.5n2 + 3.5n + 1

2.5 Introduction to affine geometry II

Over a half-century ago, Ehrhart generalized Pick's theorem to the case of rational

vertices and higher dimensions. However, for us to expand some of the concepts from the
lattice polygon case, we must first introduce some more definitions from affine geometry.

For the rest of the paper, when we refer to dimension, we mean affine dimension, defined as
follows:

A subset X of Euclidean space has affine dimension d where d + 1 is the minimal size

of a subset X' of X for which Aff(X') = Aff(X).

Pick's original theorem did not actually concern the dilated polygon, but the step from Pick's
original polygon to the dilated polygon can be easily made, e.g., [22].
9
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For instance, a plane is 2-dimensional since it can only be formed by 3 or more

points; a line is 1-dimensional since it can only be formed by 2 or more points; and a single

point is 0-dimensional. A hyperplane is an affine subspace (closed under affine transforms)

of ℝd with dimension d – 1, or co-dimension 10 1. Thus, in ℝ2, a hyperplane is a line (e.g., one
of the lines from the system of linear equations for the P5 example); in ℝ3, a hyperplane is a

plane; and in ℝd, a hyperplane is the set of solutions to a single linear equation:
𝑎⃑ · 𝑥⃑ = 𝑎1 𝑥1 + 𝑎2 𝑥2 + … + 𝑎𝑑 𝑥𝑑 ≥ 𝑏

�𝑏 ϵ ℝ, 𝑎 ≠ �0⃑�.

A Closed half-space is the set of all points on or to one side of a hyperplane. Equivalently, it
is the solution set to a single linear inequality. A polytope is a bounded intersection of

finitely many closed half spaces. Equivalently, a polytope is the convex hull of finitely many
points of ℝd. For instance, P5 (from Section 2.4) is a polytope because it is the bounded

intersection of five closed half spaces (think 5-sided polygon), where each closed half space
is the set of all points on or to one side of 1-dimensional hyperplanes, or lines. In terms of

convex hulls, P5 is a polytope because it the convex hull of the set of points {(0, 0), (2, 0), (3,
2), (1, 3), (0, 2)}.

The following is a famous example of a 2-dimensional polytope living in ℝ3.

Consider the intersection of the set of closed half spaces: x, y, z ≥ 0, with x + y + z ≤ 1 and x +
y + z ≥ 1. This may be represented as CH{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)}, or with matrix
notation as

In general, the co-dimension of an affine subspace V living in an affine space W is Dim(W) Dim(V).
10
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−1 0
0
⎡ 0 −1 0 ⎤ 𝑥
⎢
⎥
0 −1⎥ �𝑦� ≤
⎢0
⎢1
1
1⎥ 𝑧
⎣−1 −1 −1⎦

0
⎡0⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢0⎥
⎢1⎥
⎣−1⎦

The intersection of the five closed half spaces forms a 2-dimensional polytope known as the

2-simplex, shown below in Figure 8.

Figure 8. The standard 2-Simplex in ℝ3.

More generally, we form the n-simplex as follows: Let xi ≥ 0 (i = 1, …, n + 1)
∑𝑛+1
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 1

∑𝑛+1
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1.

If for some V ⊂ ℤd, a polytope P = CH(V), then P is called an integral polytope. If V ⊂

ℚd, then P is called a rational polytope. Note that the standard 2-Simplex shown above is

an integral polytope, as it is the convex hull of the integer points (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and (0, 0,
1). Also, in our earlier example, P5 is an integral polytope, since all vertices are on integer

lattice points.
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2.6 Quasi-Polynomials, Ehrhart's Theorem, and McMullen's Theorem
Ehrhart theory allows us to count integer points in rational polytopes, not just

integral polytopes. Take for example the following rational polytope, which we'll call PΔ, on

an integer lattice.

(0, 2/3)
(0, 0)

(0, 2/3)

Figure 9. A rational polytope in ℝ2, the triangle with vertices (0,0), (2/3,
0), and (0, 2/3), is seen dilated by factors of 2, 3, and 4.

In Figure 9, LPΔ (1) = 1, or in other words, the original triangle only contains one

lattice point (at the origin); LPΔ (2) = 3; LPΔ (3) = 6; and LPΔ (4) = 6. Notice how LPΔ (n)
increases, but then stalls when LPΔ (3) = LPΔ (4) = 6. Rational polytopes can pick up

integer lattice points in fits and starts as they dilate, but although this behavior may appear

random, we will soon see that it actually has periodic features. Accordingly, we use

functions known as quasi-polynomials, a generalized form of polynomials, to calculate

Lp(n).

A function f: ℕ → ℕ is a quasi-polynomial if there exists an integer N > 0 and

polynomials fo, f1, …, fN-1 such that

f(n) = fi (n)

if n ≡ i mod N,
34

where the (non-unique) integer N is called the quasi-period of f . Equivalently, we can write
f(n) = cd (n)nd + cd−1 (n)nd−1 + . . . + c0 (n),

where ci(n) is a periodic function with integral period. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ d, the quasi-period N

must divisible by the minimal period of each function ci(n), although its non-uniqueness is
due to the fact that it need not be least common multiple (lcm) [24].

To illustrate how we interpret the above definitions, we will consider the following

quasi-polynomial of degree 2, which we note does not correspond to any figure in this
paper.

f(n) = ≪ 1, 2 ≫ n2 + ≪ 3, 4, 5 ≫ n+≪ 6 ≫

Here, the fact that the quadratic coefficient <<1, 2>> has two entries represents that c2(n)

has period 2. Thus c2(n) = 1 if n ≡ 0 mod 2, and c2(n) = 2 if n ≡ 1 mod 2. Similarly, c1(n)

has period 3 and c0(n) has period 1, i.e., c0(n) = 6 all of the time. By way of example, for n =

5, we would get c2(5) = 2, c1(5) = 5, and c0(5) = 6. In the context of the first definition, we

see that N = 6 is a quasi-period for f(n), as it is divisible by each of the coefficient functions'

periods of 2, 3, and 1. And we can see that there exists polynomials:
𝑓0 (𝑛) = 𝑛2 + 3𝑛 + 6

𝑓1 (𝑛) = 2𝑛2 + 4𝑛 + 6
𝑓2 (𝑛) = 𝑛2 + 5𝑛 + 6

𝑓3 (𝑛) = 2𝑛2 + 3𝑛 + 6
𝑓4 (𝑛) = 𝑛2 + 4𝑛 + 6

𝑓5 (𝑛) = 2𝑛2 + 5𝑛 + 6
35

where f(n) = fi(n) if n ≡ i mod 6. For the remainder of this discussion, we will use the

second definition of quasi-polynomials, rather than the definition that makes use of quasiperiod. We are now ready to state the generalized version of Ehrhart’s Theorem.

Ehrhart’s Theorem: Let nP be a d-dimensional (affine dimension d) rational polytope P in
ℝk dilated by a factor of some n ϵ ℕ. Then the number of lattice points Lp(n) is always a

degree d quasi-polynomial, called the Ehrhart quasi-polynomial. In particular, if P is an
integral polytope, Lp(n) is a polynomial. 11

In the late 1970s, British mathematician Peter McMullen expanded on Ehrhart's

work by further interpreting the coefficients of the Ehrhart quasi-polynomial. First, let the

i-index of a rational d-dimensional polytope P be the smallest number si ∈ ℤ>0, i ∈ ℤ≥0, such
that for each i-dimensional face Fi of P, the affine hull of siFi contains at least one integer

point. For this definition, we say the entire polytope P is a d-dimensional face of itself.

Note that if i ≥ j, then si|sj [6, 25]. To better understand these definitions, consider the 21 3 −1

1 −1

5

−2 5 1

dimensional rational polytope, P = CH{(2 , 4 , 12 ), (6 , 12 , 12), ( 3 , 6 , 6)} and its corresponding

affine hull.

Ehrhart also showed that the minimum quasi-period of Lp(n) divides the lcm of the denominators
of the coordinates of P's vertices [8, 24].
11
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F1,3

F1,1

F1,2

Figure 10. Upper left: the 2-dimensional rational polytope P=
1 3 −1
1 −1 5
−2 5 1
CH{( , , ), ( , , ), ( , , )}, dilated by factors of 1 ≤ n ≤ 6, with
2 4 12
6 12 12
3 6 6
three 1-dimensional faces, F1,1, F1,2, F1, 3. Lower right: the intersection of
corresponding affine hulls and the first octant for each nP.

Here, P = F2 is necessarily the only 2-dimensional face of the polytope. From the

three points that build P, we find that the affine hull of F2 is the set of points {x1, x2, x3 | 3x1
+ 6x2 + 12x3 = 5}. An easy check to see if the affine hull contains any integer lattice points
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may be done by calculating the greatest common denominator (gcd) of the coefficients of

the xi; there exists such an integer solution if and only if the gcd of the coefficients divides
the constant term (5 in this case). Observe that by manipulating denominators, we can

assume that the coefficients and the constant term can always be chosen to be integers if

the initial polytope is rational. We leave the proof that the hyperplane {x1, x2, . . ., xd | ∀i: αi,

b ∈ ℤ and α1x1 + α1x1 + . . . + αdxd = b} contains integer points iff gcd(α1, α2, . . ., αd)| b to the

reader. Note that this method can only be used to confirm the existence of integer points in
affine hulls of co-dimension 1.

Since gcd(3, 6, 12) = 3, and 3 ∤ 5, we know that Aff(F2) does not contain any integer

lattice points. Furthermore, the affine hull of 2F2 = {x1, x2, x3 | 3x1 + 6x2 + 12x3 = 10} and 3 ∤

10. However, continuing in this way, we see that the affine hull of 3F3 does contain integer

points (e.g., (1, 0, 1)) as 3 ∣ 15. Thus, since there is only one 2-dimensional face and 3 is the
smallest integer s2 such that Aff(s2F2) contains integer lattice points, we conclude that the
2-index for P is s2 = 3. We also conjecture that 6 is the smallest integer s1 such that

Aff�s1 F1,1 �, Aff�s1 6F1,2 �, and Aff(s1 6F1,3 ) all contain integer points, so we conclude that the
1-index for P is s1 = 6. 12 Finally, we observe that the 0-index of P is simply the least

common denominator (lcm) of the denominators of the coordinates of the three points (as
a 0-dimensional face and the corresponding affine hull are the same point in P). By

inspection, we find that the 0-index is s0 = 12. We see that s2 ∣ s1 ∣ s0, as noted above. We

are now ready to state McMullen's theorem.

12 This conjecture is based on our only finding integer points contained within each of the three 1dimensional face's affine hulls dilated by a factor of 6 (or a multiple thereof). Recall that we cannot
apply the same method used for affine hull of the 2-dimensional face, since the affine hulls of the 1dimensional faces of P live in ℝ3 and therefore do not have co-dimension 1.
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McMullen's Theorem: Let P be a rational d-dimensional polytope in ℝk with
LP (n) = cd (n)nd + cd−1 (n)nd−1 + . . . + c0 (n),

as the Ehrhart quasi-polynomial. Given a dimension i, with 0 ≤ i ≤ d, let si be the i-index of

P. Then si is a period of ci(t) [6, 25].

One consequence of McMullen's theorem is that if P is full-dimensional (d = k), then

it follows that cd(n) has period 1, since the affine hull of P is all of Rk, which necessarily

contains integer points. In fact, Ehrhart showed that for full-dimensional polytopes, cd(n) =

vol(P) [8, 26]. We will now prove Ehrhart's Theorem and McMullen's Theorem in parallel.
2.7 Proof of Ehrhart's Theorem, McMullen's Theorem

We will follow the form and substance of Sam and Woods [6], who employed

simpler but less powerful tools than Ehrhart used in his original proof, which involved

generating functions [8, 26]. When possible, we will fill in details omitted by the original
paper. First, we must prove a series of lemmas.

Lemma 4.5: Define the falling factorial id ≔ i(i - 1)(i - 2) . . . (i - (d - 1)). Then
n

P(n) asserts that � id =
i=0

1
(n + 1)d+1 .
d+1

We'll prove the lemma by induction on n. For the base case, let n = 0. Then on the left hand
side (LHS), we compute:
n

� id = 0d = 0(0 − 1) . . . (0 − d + 1) = 0.
i=0
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And on the right hand side (RHS), we compute:
1

d+1

1

1

(0 + 1)d+1 = �d+1 � 1d+1 = �d+1� (1)(0) . . . (1 − d + 1) = 0, as desired.

Thus P(n) holds for n = 0. Next we'll assume that that P(n) holds for n and we'll show that
P(n + 1) holds. We compute:
n+1

n

i=0

i=0

� id = � id + (n + 1)d =

And we want to show:
1
(n
d+1

1
(n + 1)d+1 + (n + 1)d
d+1

1

(n + 1)d+1 + (n + 1)d =
d+1

1

d+1

(n + 2)d+1 . We expand the LHS:

1

+ 1)d+1 + (n + 1)d = �d+1 (n + 1)(n) . . . �n − (d − 1)�� + �(n + 1)(n) . . . �n − (d − 2)��.

And similarly, for the RHS:
1

d+1

Now let a =

1

d+1

1

(n + 2)d+1 =

d+1

(n + 2)(n + 1) . . . �n − (d − 2)�.

(n + 2)(n + 1) . . . �n − (d − 2)�.

Then substituting,, we see that the LHS becomes:
(n−(d−1))
a
(n+2)

=

(n−d+1+d+1)
(n+2)

a=

+

(n+2)

(n+2)

(d+1)

(n+2)

a,

a = a, as desired.

Thus we have proved that P(n+1) holds, and the lemma follows. ∎
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Lemma 4.6: Let f(n) = cd (n)nd + cd−1 (n)nd−1 + . . . + c0 (n) be a quasi-polynomial of
degree d, where ci(t) is a periodic function of period si, for each i. Define F: ℤ≥0 →ℚ by
�

an
�
b

F(n) = � f(i),
i=0

sb

i
where a, b ∈ ℤ and ⌊∗⌋ is the greatest integer ("floor") function. Let Si = gcd (s
. Then:
,a)
i

(1) F(n) = Cd+1 (n)nd+1 + Cd (n)nd + . . . + C0 (n) is a quasi-polynomial of degree d + 1;
(2) lcm{Sd, Sd-1, . . ., Si} is a period of Ci(t), for 0 ≤ i ≤ d; and
(3) Cd+1 has period 1.

Before we prove the lemma, we'll consider an example given by Sam and Woods [6].

Suppose we have the very simple quasi-polynomial,

1
f(n) = ≪ , 0 ≫ n,
2

and we would like to evaluate the sum,

�

3n
�
2

F(n) = � f(i).
i=0

Then the period of c1(n) is 2 (as there are two spaces in the brackets before n) and the

period of c0(n) is 1 (as c0(n) = 0 all of the time). Thus s1 =2 and s0 = 1, and since a = 3, b = 2,
we get:
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S1 =

(2)(2)
1(2)
= 4 and S0 =
= 2.
1
1

From part (3) of Lemma 4.6, we know that the period of Cd+1(n), or the period of the

coefficient of the quadratic term in this case, is 1; the period of the C1(n) term is lcm(S1) =
lcm{4} = 4; and the period of the C0(n) term is lcm{S1, S0} = lcm{4, 2} = 4. In fact,
3n
�
2

�

i=0

j=0

�

3n
�
4

F(n) = � f(i) = � j,
where we were allowed to cut the number of terms in half and substitute in j because f(i)
alternates between 0 for i odd, and i/2 for i even. This gives
�

3n
�
4

2
1 3n
3n
1 3n
� j = �� �� �� � + 1� = �� � + 1�
2 4
4
2 4
j=0

=

3 −3
3
−3 −1 −3
9 2
n +≪ ,
, 0,
≫ n + ≪ 0,
,
,
≫.
32
8 16
16
32 8 32

Observe that the periodicities of the coefficients of this quasi-polynomial agree with the

above calculations we made according to the lemma. In particular, we see the importance
of using lcm{Sd, Sd-1, . . ., Si} to find the period of Ci(n); while s1 was the only periodic term
for f(n), its periodicity also affected the C0 term of F(n). We will now prove the lemma.
For d, s, j ∈ ℤ≥0, let φ be the periodic function

and g be the quasi-polynomial

1 if n ≡ j (mod s)
φs,j (n) = �
0 otherwise
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d−1

n−j
g d,s,j (n) = φs,j (n) � �
− k�.
s
k=0

1

n−0

Thus, in our last example, we had ≪ 2 , 0 ≫ n = ≪ 1, 0 ≫ �

2

− 0� = g1,2,0 (n). Since we

may always write the function f(n) as a linear combination of these quasi-polynomials (for
various degree d, period s, and j) , we need only prove that
�

an
�
b

Gd,s,j (n) = � g s,j (i)
i=0

sb

is a quasi-polynomial of degree d+1 with period S = gcd (s,a) and leading term periodicity 1.

Now, for some m ∈ ℤ≥0 with n ≡ j (mod) s, we may reduce g to a regular polynomial in m by

setting n = ms + j so that

d−1

(ms + j) − j
g d,s,j (ms + j) = φs,j (ms + j) � �
− k�
s
k=0

d−1

= 1 �(m − k) = m(m − 1) . . . �m − (d − 1)� = md .
k=0

Therefore, for any k ∈ ℤ+, we have
k

�

k−j
�
s

� g s,j (i) = � g s,j (ms + j)
i=0

m=0

�

k−j
�
s

= � md
m=0
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d+1
1
k−j
=
��
� + 1�
d+1
s

by Lemma 4.5.

an

For a, b ∈ ℤ, we may substitute so that k = � b �. Thus,

d+1
an
� �−j
1
�� b
� + 1�
Gd,s,j (n) =
d+1
s

is a quasi-polynomial with degree d + 1, as desired. To check that Gd,s,j (n) has period S =
sb

gcd (s,a)

and a leading coefficient with periodicity 1, we will substitute n = mS + k and show

that the resultant expression reduces to a polynomial in m:
Gd,s,j (mS + k) = Gd,s,j �m

sb
+ k�
gcd (s, a)

d+1
sb
⎢ a �m gcd(s, a) + k�
⎥
� − j⎥
d+1
⎛⎢�
⎞
ams
ak
b
⎥
+� �−j
⎟
1 ⎜⎢
1
b
gcd(s, a)
⎥ + 1⎟
⎜⎢
=
��
� + 1� ,
d + 1 ⎜⎢
d+1
s
s
⎟
⎥
⎜⎢
⎟
⎥
⎢
⎥
⎝⎣
⎠
⎦
ams

where we have removed the floor function for gcd(s,a), since this is necessarily an integer.

Simplifying further, we get

d+1
ak
� �−j
am
1
Gd,s,j (mS + k) =
�
+� b
� + 1� ,
d + 1 gcd(s, a)
s
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a polynomial in m with leading coefficient that does not depend on k and thus has period 1.
The lemma follows. ∎

We will now proceed to prove Ehrhart's Theorem and McMullen's Theorem in

parallel, by induction on polytope dimension d. For the base case, let d = 0. Then a rational
0-dimensional polytope is just a point in ℚk. Let D be the smallest positive integer such
that DP is an integer point. Then it follows that

1 if D ∣ n
LP (n) = c0 (n), where c0 (n) = �
.
0 otherwise

In other words, the number of integer points in the polytope will always be either 1

or 0, as the polytope itself is just a single point; it is only an integer point if the dilation

factor n is some multiple of D. Therefore, Lp(n) is a degree 0 quasi-polynomial that reduces
to a polynomial (periodicity 1) when D = 1, so Ehrhart's Theorem for the base case follows.

Furthermore, the 0-index of P is s0 = D, since the affine hull of a point is just that point, and

D is the smallest positive integer to produce an integer point. And since the period of c0(n)
is D, then McMullen's Theorem for the base case follows as well.

We will now assume that these two theorems hold for all d' < d. For the inductive

step, we will first prove three claims.

Claim 1: Without loss of generality (WLOG), P is full-dimensional (dim(P) = k).

Proof of Claim 1: Let s' be the smallest positive integer such that Aff(s'P) contains integer
points. Then s'∣ si for each i, as previously noted. Now let V = Aff(s'P). While we do not

provide a proof, there exists an affine transformation T: V → ℝdim(P) that maps V ∩ ℤk (the

integer lattice points in V) bijectively onto ℤdim(P), and we say P' = T(s'P). Since V contains
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s'P and ℝdim(P) contains T(s'P), then in particular, the bijective mapping T preserves integer

points in the dilated polytopes. For example, consider the polytope

P = CH{(3,0, 0), (0, 3,0), (0, 0,3)}. P is not full dimensional, as it is a 2-dimensional

polytope in ℝ3. In addition, we see that s' = 1, since Aff(P) (and in fact P itself) contains
integer points. In this case, we can produce a bijective affine transformation T(1P) by
simply projecting P onto the x1-x2 plane as follows:

Figure 11. 1P (left) and T(1P) = P' (right).

Although the above example is quite simple, it demonstrates a one-to-one mapping from
V ∩ ℤ3 onto ℤ2, and in particular, as seen in Figure 11, LP (1) = LP′ (1) = 10.

If we can prove the theorem for our full-dimensional polytope P', we can prove it for

P, since

n
′
′ � � if s ∣ n
L
P
LP (n) = �
.
s′
0 otherwise

Thus we may assume WLOG that P is full-dimensional (dim(P) = k)).
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Claim 2: WLOG, P = CH{0, Q}, where Q is a (d - 1)-dimensional rational polytope.

Proof of Claim 2: WLOG, we may translate some rational d-dimensional polytope by an

integer vector so that it does not contain the origin, as such a translation will clearly not
alter the number of integer lattice points in the polytope. As we will see, LP (n) may be

expressed as sums and differences of the number of integer points in polytopes of the form
{0,Q} (including lower dimensional Q), using inclusion-exclusion methods to properly
count the intersection of faces. To accomplish this, we define two types of faces:

1. The collection ℱv of faces F of P that are "visible": a facet (i.e., a (d -1)-dimensional face)

is visible if

∀a ∈ F, ∀ λ s. t. 0 < 𝜆 < 1 [ λa ∉ P],

and a lower dimensional face is visible if every facet that it is contained in is visible.

Geometrically, a face is visible if a line from the origin to any point on the face does not
contain any other point in the polytope.

2. The collection ℱh of faces F of P that are "hidden": a facet is "hidden" if it is not visible,

and a lower dimensional face is hidden if every facet that it is contained in is hidden.

Geometrically, a face is hidden if some point on the face is 'behind' another point on the

polytope, i.e., a line from the origin to some point on the face contains another point in the
polytope.

For instance, consider the simple example where P = CH{(1,1),(3,1),(3,2)}.
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x2

(0,0)

(3,2)
(1,1)

(3,1)

x1

Figure 12. The 2-dimensional polytope P = CH{(1,1),(3,1),(3,2)}.

We see that CH{(1,1),(3,2)}, a 1-dimensional facet of P, contains the point (3,2), and

if we choose λ = 1/2, then we get (1/2)(3, 2) = (3/2, 1), which is in P. Thus this facet is not
visible, so it is hidden. We can use the same point (3, 2) and the same λ to show that

CH{(3,1),(3,2)} is hidden as well. However, by inspection we see that for each point a in the
facet CH{(1,1),(3,1)}, λa will not be contained in P (since any λ will send the x2 coordinates

of points in CH{(1,1),(3,1)} to some x2 < 1, and therefore out of P). Thus CH{(1,1),(3,1)} is
visible. From a geometric stand point, we see that a line from the origin to almost every

point in CH{(1,1),(3,2)} and CH{(3,1),(3,2)} must pass through P, but a line from the origin
to any point in CH{(1,1),(3,1)} will not. In addition, the only 0-dimensional face that is

hidden is the point on top of the triangle, since both facets containing it are hidden. The
other 0-dimensional faces are neither visible, nor hidden.

For a face F of P, let PF = CH(0,F). Then inclusion-exclusion provides the following:
LP (n) = � (−1)d−1−dim(F) LPF (n) − � (−1)d−1−dim(F) �LPF (n) − LF (n)�.
F∈ℱH

F∈ℱv

While we omit it here, a proof of this identity using a topological approach was included in
the original paper by Sam and Woods [6]. We will, however, include and explain a helpful
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example from the same paper. Consider the following generic 2-dimensional polytope P
(bold) in ℝ2 (the plane of the paper), which has been translated such that it does not

include the origin.

Figure 13. Arbitrary 2-dimensional polytope P (bold) shown with 4 1dimensional facets and 4 0-dimensional faces labeled. 4 2-dimensional
convex hulls are formed from the origin and facets [6].

In the above figure, we see right away that F1,1 and F1,2 are hidden, so F0,2 is also hidden.

F1,3 and F1,4 are visible, so F0,4 is visible. Since F0,1 and F0, 3 are contained in both hidden and

visible facets, we consider these faces neither hidden nor visible. We can now interpret the
above inclusion-exclusion formula for P as follows:

LP (n) = � (−1)d−1−dim(F) LPF (n) − � (−1)d−1−dim(F) �LPF (n) − LF (n)�
F∈ℱH

F∈ℱv

= �LPF1,1 (n) + LPF1,2 (n) − LPF0,2 (n)�

− ��LPF1,3 (n) − LF1,3 (n)� + �LPF1,4 (n) − LF1,4 (n)� − �LPF0,4 (n) − LF0,4 (n)��.

Geometrically, this looks like:
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Figure 14. A polygon decomposition: a geometric interpretation of the
above inclusion-exclusion formula [6].

For an example of such inclusion-exclusion counting, let's assume that the face F0,2 is

actually a point on the integer lattice. Then in the above figure and formula, we see that F0,2

is included once by PF1,1 , once by PF1,2 , excluded once by PF0,2 , and does not appear anywhere
else. Thus F0,2 is only counted once, as desired. As another example, we know that the

origin is an integer point, but one that is outside of P by assumption. The origin is included
a total of 3 times, once each by PF1,1 , PF1,2 , and PF0,1 ; and it is excluded a total of 3 times, once
each by PF1,3 , PF1,4 , and PF0,4 . As the inclusions and exclusions cancel, the origin is not

counted at all, as desired.

Returning to the proof of our claim, it remains to be shown that each of the

decomposed parts of the polytope P (represented by terms in the inclusion-exclusion

formula) can be dilated by an integer such that their affine hulls contain an integer point.
We know that for any face F of P, the i-dimensional faces F' of PF are either faces of P or

contain the origin, depending on whether F is hidden or visible. If F' is a face of P, then
Aff(siF') contains integer points by definition of si. In the other case, if F' contains the

origin, then Aff(siF') contains integer points because the origin itself is an integer point.
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Thus, in either case, F' satisfies the assumptions of the Ehrhart's and McMullen's theorems,

so we have addressed the first two terms of the inclusion-exclusion sum. For the final term,
∑F∈ℱv (−1)d−1−dim(F) LF (n), we are dealing only with faces of P of dimension d - 1 or lower.

Here, according to the inductive hypothesis, the conditions of the theorems are also

satisfied. Therefore, if we prove the theorems for a polytope P' of the form conv{0, Q},

where Q is a (d - 1)-dimensional rational polytope, then the theorems follow for P as well,
since we have shown that the number of integer points in P can always be considered as
sums and differences of the number of integer points in different P'.

Claim 3: WLOG, we may assume P = conv{0, Q}, where Q is a (d - 1)-dimensional rational

polytope living in the hyperplane xd = q, where q ∈ ℚ>0.

Proof of Claim 3: We say that a transformation x' = Ax is unimodular if A is a square integer
matrix with det(A) = ±1. Furthermore, a linear transformation sends a lattice to itself iff

the transformation is unimodular. While we omit a proof of this here, the interested reader
can find this proof and a general introduction to lattice transformations in [27]. Our ability
to always perform a unimodular transformation proves the claim.

Figure 15. An example of an application of claims 1 - 3. From left to
right: a 2-dimensional polygon in ℝ3 is projected onto ℝ2 via an affine
transform T, with integer points preserved; inclusion-exclusion is
applied using CH(0, Q), where here Q is the 1-dimensional facet F1,1 of P;
a unimodular transformation sends CH(0,Q) to the 1-dimensional
hyperplane x2 = q, where q ∈ ℚ>0, and integer points are preserved.
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We will now proceed to prove Ehrhart's Theorem and McMullen's Theorem for P =

conv{0, Q}, where Q is a (d - 1)-dimensional rational polytope living in the hyperplane xd =
a

q, with q ∈ ℚ>0. Since q is a positive rational, then WLOG, P lives in the hyperplane xd = b,

where a, b are positive integers and gcd(a, b) = 1. Since faces of Q are in fact faces of P, then
b

for an i-dimensional face of Q, Aff(siF) contains integer points. Now let Q = a Q , so then Q
a

lives in the hyper plane xd = 1. Then for an i-dimensional face F of Q, Aff(si b F) contains
integer points. So we have that the integer points in a dilated P, denoted by the
intersection nP ∩ ℤd, is the disjoint union
�

na
�
b

� iQ ∩ ℤd ,
i=0

which means that the number of integer points in P is just the sum
�

na
�
b

LP (n) = � LQ (i).
i=0

Since we know that LQ (i) is a (d - 1)-degree quasi-polynomial by the inductive hypothesis,

we may conclude that LP(n) is a quasi-polynomial of degree d by Lemma 4.6. Furthermore,

the Si in the statement of Lemma 4.6 are given by

a
�si � b
asi
b
Si =
=
= si .
a
a
gcd �si , a�
b

And since sd ∣ sd-1 ∣ . . . ∣ s0, then si = lcm(sd, sd-1, . . ., si), which is a period of the ith

coefficient of LP(n) by Lemma 4.6. We also see that if P is an integral polytope, then sd = sd-1

= . . . = s0 = 1, so 1 is a period of each coefficient of LP(n), making LP(n) simply a polynomial.
Thus the inductive step holds and we are done. ∎
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2.8 Computer generation of the Ehrhart quasi-polynomial counting 3-way ties
For his 2008 undergraduate senior thesis, Dai modeled voting situations that produce a 3way Borda tie between 3 candidates as a system of linear constraints. In order to understand his
methodology, we revisit to some notation that we mentioned briefly in Section 1.4. Let AR = <p,
q, r> be a reference enumeration of candidates in an election with s(p), s(q), and s(r) denoting the
Borda scores for p, q, and r, respectively. Then there is a 3-way tie when s(p) = s(q) = s(r).
Now, using the same list of rankings from Section 1.1, consider the voting situation
∏ = (n1 , n2 , n3 , n4 , n5 , n6 ),

where n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n. With the o-c Borda count, we see that s(p) = n1 + n2 -

n4 - n6 (i.e., p collects 1 point from each of the voters casting ballots where p is ranked first,

no points from voters who cast ballots where p is ranked second, and -1 point from each of

the voters casting ballots where p is ranked last). Similarly, s(q) = n3 + n4 - n2 - n5, and s(r)

= n5 + n6 - n1 - n3. And since s(p) = s(q) = s(r), then n1 + n2 - n4 - n6 = n3 + n4 - n2 - n5 = n5 + n6

- n1 - n3. We can now set up our system of linear constraints as follows:
(1) n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 = n
(2) n1 + n2 - n4 - n6 = n3 + n4 - n2 - n5
(3) n3 + n4 - n2 - n5 = n5 + n6 - n1 - n3
(4) n1 ≥ 0
(5) n2 ≥ 0
⋮
(9) n3 ≥ 0.

Since each of the ni is nonnegative, then the number of integer solutions to the

above system of linear equations equals the number of voting situations for n voters that
will produce a 3-way Borda tie between 3-candidates. However, we are not quite at the
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final form of the system of linear equations that will be used by the computer software. In
order to get there, we will write (1), (2), and (3) using linear inequalities and also rearrange terms in (2) and (3). Thus the first three lines of the above system become:
(1) n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 ≤ n
(2) n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 + n5 + n6 ≥ n
(3) n1 + 2n2 - n3 - 2n4 + n5 - n6 ≤ 0
(4) n1 + 2n2 - n3 - 2n4 + n5 - n6 ≥ 0
(5) n1 - n2 + 2n3 + n4 - 2n5 - n6 ≤ 0
(6) n1 - n2 + 2n3 + n4 - 2n5 - n6 ≥ 0,

which may be written in matrix form as

1
1
1
1
⎡−1 −1 −1 −1
⎢
2 −1 −2
⎢1
−1
−2
1
2
⎢
⎢ 1 −1 2
1
⎣−1 1 −2 −1

n
1
1 n1
⎤
⎡
⎤
⎡
−n⎤
−1 −1 n2
⎥ ⎢n ⎥ ⎢ 0 ⎥
1 −1⎥ ⎢ 3 ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
≤
,
−1 1 ⎥ ⎢n4 ⎥ ⎢ 0 ⎥
−2 −1⎥ ⎢n5 ⎥ ⎢ 0 ⎥
2
1 ⎦ ⎣n6 ⎦ ⎣ 0 ⎦

a 3-dimensional polytope living in ℝ6. Dai used computer software LattE, short for Lattice

point Enumeration, to find all nonnegative integer solutions for the above system and

therefore the number of voting situations vs(n) that produce an m-way Borda tie for 3
candidate elections [28]. Consistent with Ehrhart's Theorem, his result was a quasipolynomial, specifically

vs(n) =

n3 + 9n2 +≪ 42,15 ≫ n+≪ 72,25, −88,9,56,7 ≫
,
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with degree 3 and minimal periods of 1, 1, 2, and 6 for c3(n), c2(n), c1(n), and c0(n),
respectively.
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Section III
Beyond m = 3: Using Permutahedra to Count Borda Ties
3.0 Brute force combinatorics: confirming the computer result
Dai used basic combinatorial methods to calculate the same quasi-polynomial

function vs(n) from Section 2.8. Since we cannot currently compute the Ehrhart quasi-

polynomial for 4-way Borda ties between 4 alternatives with the LattE software, this brute

force combinatorial approach initially seemed the most relevant for our goal of expanding

beyond the case of m = 3. However, our current inability to use combinatorial methods to
find a quasi-polynomial expression that counts 4-way Borda ties between 4 alternatives

demonstrates that the tremendous increase in complexity from 3 to 4 alternatives is not

limited to Ehrhart theory. Indeed, our research has focused on pinning down exactly how
complex the 'brute force' approach becomes when increasing the number of alternatives
from 3 to 4, as much as it has been concerned with actually counting ties. Although we

have not reached our ultimate goal of counting all 4-way Borda ties between 4 alternatives,
we have found some interesting connections and results by expanding on Dai's

combinatorial methods. Therefore, we will begin this section by discussing the key parts of
Dai's counting techniques.

First, recall from Section 1.4 that a voting situation ∏ = (n1 , n2 , . . , nm! ) is central if

it produces an m-way tie in the Borda count. We can think of all central voting situations

for m alternatives as forming an ordering in the following way:
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Let ∏1 = (n1, n2, . . . , nm!), ∏2 = (n1', n2', . . . , nm!') be any two central voting situations.

Then ∏1 > ∏2 iff

1) ni ≥ ni' for all 0 ≤ i ≤ m!, and

2) ni > ni' for at least one i with 0 ≤ i ≤ m!

We say that a voting situation is elementary if it is a minimal central voting situation

in the above ordering. 13 Put differently, a voting situation is elementary if it is central and
contains no smaller central voting situations in the ordering. For the case of m = 3, there
are two 'types' of elementary voting situations (we will discuss what 'type' means in the

next section): reversals and cycles. As shown below in Figure 16, an elementary reversal is
a voting situation with 2 voters, where the rank vectors 14 of cast ballots are antipodal

points on the permutahedron, i.e., points opposite each other on the permutahedron with
mean at the center.

Figure 16. The three elementary reversals for m = 3.

As with our definition of central, our definition of elementary is also different from that used by
Cervone et al and Dai, but equivalent for the case of m = 3 [2, 9].
14 Recall from Section 1.2 that a rank vector ρ(σ) for a ranking σ of m alternatives {a1, a2, . . ., am} is
the m-tuple of ranks ρ(ai) in reference enumeration order, e.g., for reference enumeration
AR = <p, q, r> and a ranking σ = q > p > r, we get the rank vector ρ(σ) = (ρ(p), ρ(q), ρ(r)) = (1, 2, 0).
13
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As seen in Figure 16, an elementary reversal in a 3-candidate election is formed

when two voters agree on a second place candidate but disagree on first and third choice

candidates. Next, we form an elementary cycle for m = 3, also known as a Condorcet 15 cycle

(or Condorcet paradox) for m = 3, by having three voters cast ballots in the following way:
Say a ballot is cast for (p > q > r). Then another cast ballot sends p to third place,

and q and r each move up one space to first and second place, respectively (q > r > p).

Finally, a third cast ballot sends q to last place, and moves r and p up to first and second
place, respectively (r > p > q).

Equivalently, a cycle can be formed using rank vectors. For a rank vector of

standard Borda scoring weights (w1, w2, w3) corresponding to a cast ballot, another ballot

is cast with rank vector (w1+ 1 mod 3, w2 + 1 mod 3, w3 + 1 mod 3), and a third ballot is cast
with rank vector (w1 + 2 mod 3, w2 + 2 mod 3, w3 + 2 mod 3). This definition can be

adjusted for non-standard Borda weights (e.g., for the o-c Borda count). As shown in Figure
17, there are two elementary cycles for m = 3.

Condorcet cycles are named for 18th Century French mathematician and political scientist
Marquis de Condorcet, who developed a voting rule in which Condorcet cycles also produce ties.
Condorcet mysteriously died soon after being imprisoned in the aftermath of the French Revolution
[29].

15
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Figure 17. 2 elementary cycles (reference enumeration AR = <P, Q, R>).

Dai's goal was to count the number of central voting situations for 3 candidates (and

thus the number of 3-way Borda ties between 3 candidates) by counting the number of

positive linear combinations of elementary voting situations. His main challenge with this

approach was the problem of double-counting. For instance, a voting situation where each
of 6 voters casts a ballot with a different ranking clearly produces a 3-way tie - in terms of
the Permuta-mean rule, the mean of the 6 different rank vector coordinates on the

permutahedron is at the center. Of course, we only want to count this central voting

situation once, but we see that it can be created in two ways from elementary voting
situations: as either a sum of the 3 reversals or a sum of the 2 cycles.

Dai's crucial tool for overcoming this issue was proving that every voting situation

was central if and only if it was created by a unique nonnegative (integer) linear

combination of the three reversals and only one of the two cycles. In other words, a central
voting situation created by a nonnegative linear combination of reversals and a single cycle
could only be created by that linear combination; conversely, any such linear combination
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of reversals and a single cycle created a central voting situation. While we omit the proof
here, we direct the interested reader to his 2008 thesis [8]. With this powerful result in

hand, Dai was able to make use of Theorem 1.1 by modeling each central voting situation as
a 4-tuple with entries corresponding to the number of reversals and one of the cycles in the
voting situation (multiplying by a factor of 2 at the end to account for central voting

situations constructed from each of the two cycles). Dai divided the voting situations into 6

cases: where the number of voters n = 3k (k odd); n = 3k (k even); n = 3k + 1 (k odd); n = 3k
+1 (k even); n = 3k + 2 (k odd); n = 3k + 2 (k even). For each case, Dai obtained a different
polynomial function of n, and all six polynomials were then combined into one quasi-

polynomial. Since Dai's quasi-polynomial was formed from 6 polynomials, we see that it

had quasi-period 6. As expected, this quasi-polynomial was the same one (vs(n)) given at

the end of Section 2.8.

3.1 m = 4: permuting voting situations of the same 'type'
In order to extend Dai's methods to the case of 4 candidates, we must also find the

set of elementary voting situations that will produce all central voting situations via a

unique nonnegative integer linear combination. Only in this way we can make use of the
power of Theorem 1.1. But where to begin?

Dai began by classifying elementary voting situations into two categories, cycles and

reversals, and this classification seems very natural. One type corresponds to 2 voters, the
other to 3. Furthermore, in a geometrical context, we see that any two antipodal points on
the 3-permutahedron can be mapped to two other antipodal points with rotations.

Likewise, three rank vector points corresponding to a cycle can be mapped to the other
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three-point cycle in the same way. However, in the case of the 4-permutahedron (4

candidates), classifying - and even finding - elementary voting situations becomes far more
complicated.

For m = 4, there are 12 pairs of antipodal points on the 4-permutahedron, so we can

think of these pairs as the analog of reversals for m = 3. As an example, for the reference

enumeration AR = <p, q, r, s> of alternatives in an election, the voting situation where one

voter casts a ballot for (p > q > r > s) and one voter casts a ballot for (s > r > q > p) results in

a four-way Borda tie. This voting situation and all other reversals for m = 4 are color-coded

on the permutahedron below in Figure 18.
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Figure 18. The 4-permuahedron with all twelve elementary reversals
color coded. For example, the voting situation corresponding to single
votes for the ballots with rankings (p > q > r > s) and (s > r > q > p) is
circled in red.

Now, we know that there are no elementary voting situations for four alternatives

and three voters by Theorem 1.4.3. However, by inspection and computational methods

(discussed below in Section 3.2) we have found that there are numerous elementary voting

situations for m = 4 with 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 voters; and there may be elementary profiles for
14 or more voters. Furthermore, even two elementary voting situations with the same

number of voters may have very different geometrical representations on the 461

permutahedron. For an example of this, we direct the reader to compare Appendix IIa,
Appendix 2b, and Appendix 2c, where we have included color-coded sketches of the 4-

permutahedron with all elementary voting situations for 4 voters. In addition, while there
are no elementary voting situations with an odd number of voters, there are elementary
voting situations with an even number of voters and an odd number of distinct rankings

due to repeated ballots cast. One example of this for AR = <p, q, r, s> is the voting situation

where 2 votes are cast for (s > r > q > p), and 1 vote each is cast for (q > s > p > r), (q > p > r
> s), (p > r > s > q), and (p > r > q > s).

The new complexity for m = 4 motivates our formal analysis of what it means for

two elementary voting situations (and more generally, any two voting situations) to be of

the same type. Our discussion of types of voting situations will be organized into five parts.
First, we will discuss our notion of type as being the generalization of Dai's distinction

between elementary reversals and elementary cycles for 3 alternatives. Here, we will also
define rr-type, which we conjecture may be equivalent to our general notion of type.

Second, we will define what it means for two voting situations to be of the same alternative
type (or just a-type). Next, we will define the antipodal map, followed by what it means for

two voting situations to be of the same weight type (or just w-type). Finally, we will discuss

some of the connections and results that we have found by classifying voting situations into
different versions of type. We conjecture that all voting situations generated by the

antipodal map and permutations of alternatives may be equivalent to the set of all voting
situations of the same rr-type (generated by rotations and reflections). In addition, we

direct the reader to Appendix III for a brief discussion of how we can define voter type (or

just v-type) to describe the relationship between voting situations and profiles. The reader
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should also note that throughout this section, we will repeatedly refer to two examples: one

in which we turn a 4-voter elementary profile ℙ into another 4-voter elementary profile ℙ',

and a second in which we turn an 8-voter elementary voting situation ℙ* into another 8voter elementary profile, ℙ*'. 16

3.1a Overview of type and rr-type
Working from Dai's distinction between elementary reversals and cycles, we think

of two voting situations ∏1, ∏2 as being of the same type if a transformation of the

permutahedron, where rank vectors from ∏1 are sent to rank vectors from ∏1, preserves

adjacent vertices. Now, we will classify two voting situations to be of the same rr-type (or
just type) if and only if one's rank vector locations on the permutahedron can be obtained

from the other's by a combination of rotations and reflections in (m - 1)-dimensional space
(so not the original affine space that the m-permutahedron lives in, but the affine space in

which the m-permutahedron is full-dimensional). For m = 3, we only need rotations to go
between two elementary voting situations of the same type, i.e., while preserving

adjacency. A pair of vertices on the 3-permutahedron corresponding to an elementary

reversal can be rotated in the plane of the hexagon by multiples of 120° to obtain either of
the other two elementary reversals (or the original reversal). Similarly, a set of three

vertices on the 3-permutahedron corresponding to an elementary cycle can be rotated in
the plane of the hexagon by multiples of 60° to obtain the other elementary cycle (or the
original elementary cycle). However, as we will see, the step from 3 alternatives to 4

At times we may also re-introduce labeled voters (and therefore profiles, rather than voting
situations), but we will make clear when we are doing this. Recall that any profile(s) can be turned
into a voting situation if we simply choose to ignore the identities of the voters.

16
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alternatives requires both rotations and reflections be used to obtain all elementary voting
situations of the same type. In order to rotate and reflect the m-permutahedron, we need
to define an alternative permutation, an antipodal mapping, and a weight permutation.

3.1b Alternative permutations, alternative permutation matrices, and alternative type
Let A = {a1, a2, …, am} be a set of m alternatives and V = {v1, v2, …, vn} be a set of n

voters. An alternative permutation πa: A A, written

𝑎1
𝑎2
…
𝑎𝑚
𝜋𝑎 = �𝜋(𝑎 ) 𝜋(𝑎 ) … 𝜋(𝑎 )�,
1
2
𝑚

is a permutation on the set of alternatives. For example, consider the set of four
𝑎1
alternatives {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Then the alternative permutation 𝜋𝑎 = �𝑎
1
(bijective) function from A to A where

𝑎2
𝑎3

𝑎3
𝑎2

𝑎4
𝑎4 � is the

πa(a1) = a1,

πa(a2) = a3,
πa(a3) = a2,

πa(a4) = a4.

Simply put, we have switched alternatives a2 and a3. Now, an alternative permutation
matrix 𝑃𝜋𝑎 is the m x m square matrix
𝑃𝜋𝑎

𝑝1,1
⎡𝑝
2,1
= ⎢
⎢ ⋮
⎣𝑝𝑚,1

𝑝1,2
⋱
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…
⋱

𝑝1,𝑚

⎤
⎥
⎥
𝑝𝑚,𝑚 ⎦

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎ℎ = 𝜋(𝑎𝑘 )
where 𝑝ℎ,𝑘 = �
. So for the above alternative permutation πa, we see that
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
p1,1 = 1, p2,3 = 1, p3,2 = 1,p4,4 = 1, and all remaining entries are 0. This gives the following

matrix.

𝑃𝜋𝑎

1
0
=�
0
0

0
0
1
0

0
1
0
0

0
0
�
0
1

To see how this matrix acts on a profile, consider the following scenario for 4

alternatives and 4 voters. Let Ar = <a1, a2, a2, a4> be an alternative reference enumeration

and Vr = <v1, v2, v3, v4> be a voter reference enumeration.
𝑣1
𝑎1
ℙ = 𝑎2
𝑎3
𝑎4

𝑣2
𝑎2
𝑎1
𝑎4
𝑎3

𝑣3
𝑎3
𝑎4
𝑎2
𝑎1

𝑣4
𝑎4
𝑎3
𝑎1
𝑎2

From the (elementary central) profile ℙ, we can form a corresponding m x n integer matrix
Sℙ in either of two equivalent ways. In the first method, we can consider the jth column of
the matrix Sℙ to be the rank vector for the ballot cast by the the jth voter in our voter

reference enumeration. In the second method, we can consider the ith row of Sℙ to be the

score vector of the ith alternative in our alternative reference enumeration, where a score

vector is defined as follows:

Let ai be the ith alternative in an alternative reference enumeration. Given a profile,

the score vector sc(ai)is the n-tuple such that the jth entry is equal to the Borda points

awarded by the jth voter in the voter reference enumeration. Thus for the above reference
enumerations and profile ℙ, sc(a2) = (2, 3, 1, 0), as a2 receives two points from v1’s second
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place vote, three points from v2’s first place vote, 1 point from v3’s third place vote, and no
points from v4’s last place vote.

Using either the score or rank vector method described above, we now form the

score-rank matrix Sℙ:

3
2
𝑆ℙ = �
1
0

2
3
0
1

0
1
3
2

1
0
�
2
3

Let ℙ1, ℙ2 be two profiles for m voters and n alternatives, with S1, S2 as

corresponding score-rank matrices. Then we say ℙ1 and ℙ2 are of the same alternative type
(or just a-type) if there exists an alternative permutation matrix 𝑃𝜋𝑎 ∈ 𝕄m x m such that

𝑃𝜋𝑎 S1 = S2. For instance, let’s consider the above profile ℙ with score-rank matrix Sℙ, and
the above alternative permutation πa with alternative permutation matrix 𝑃𝜋𝑎 . We

compute:

1
0
𝑃𝜋𝑎 Sℙ = �
0
0

0
0
1
0

0
1
0
0

0 3
0 2
��
0 1
1 0

2
3
0
1

0
1
3
2

1
3
0
1
�=�
2
2
3
0

2
0
3
1

0
3
1
2

1
2
�.
0
3

This second score-rank matrix, which we will call Sℙ’, has a corresponding profile ℙ’ that

may be obtained from the original reference enumeration. For instance, using the rank

vector method, we observe from the first column that the first voter cast a ballot ranking a1
first, a2 third, a3 second, and a4 last. Continuing in this way, we get

66

𝑣1
𝑎1
𝑎
ℙ′ = 3
𝑎2
𝑎4

𝑣2
𝑎3
𝑎1
𝑎4
𝑎2

𝑣3
𝑎2
𝑎4
𝑎3
𝑎1

𝑣4
𝑎4
𝑎2 .
𝑎1
𝑎3

Both of these elementary profiles may be seen on the 4-permutahedron in Appendix IIb

(with a1 = p, a2 = q, a3 = r, and a4 = s). Note that a profile/voting situation ℙ is central iff the

sum of scores in a given row of Sℙ is the same for all rows.

By looking at the geometrical representation of all points on the 4-permutahedron

(Appendix IIb), we see that by switching a2 and a3, we have rotated sets of rank vectors

(corresponding to voting situations) on the 4-permutahedron by 90° about a plane formed
by 2 of its 3 axes (e.g., in Appendix IIb, yellow coordinates go to purple coordinates).

However, we can also see that a permutation acting on the individual rank vectors does not
rotate each these coordinates by the same amount. We leave open the question of whether
an alternative permutation always produces rotations of the permutahedron, and if it does
always produce rotations, then what these rotations might look like. However, we note

that by finding out what a single transposition (such as the one sending ℙ to ℙ') does to

points on the 4-permutahedron, we can use symmetry to draw more general conclusions
about the geometrical interpretation of alternative permutations.
3.1c The antipodal map

We can also use an alternative permutation so that the set of rank vector

coordinates given by ℙ can be mapped to a set containing the antipodal rank vectors,

where the alternative permutation simply switches a3 and a4. We originally conjectured

that every such 'antipodal mapping' (formally defined in a moment) - which preserves
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adjacent points on the permutahedron and thus clearly falls within our notion of type -

could be achieved with alternative permutations. However, we soon proved our intuition
wrong by finding a counterexample. For AR = <p, q, r, s> and n = 8, consider the following

elementary voting situation:

𝟐
𝑟
∗
ℙ = 𝑝
𝑞
𝑠

𝟐
𝑞
𝑟
𝑝
𝑠

𝟑 𝟏
𝑠 𝑠
𝑝 𝑟,
𝑞 𝑞
𝑟 𝑝

𝟐
1
3
2
0

𝟑
2
1
0
3

where bold numbers above the ballot rankings represent the number of votes for each
ballot. Then ℙ* has score-rank matrix 17
Sℙ∗

𝟐
2
= 1
3
0

𝟏
0
1.
2
3

Now, we'll define the antipodal map as the permutation of scoring weights
𝜋𝑎𝑛𝑡 = �

3 2 1
0 1 2

0
�.
3

We will soon provide a more complete definition for how this permutation acts on voting
situation, but for now, we'll simply say that the antipodal map sends every individual

scoring weight (an integer) in a score-rank matrix to a new scoring weight given by πant.
Thus 3s and 0s switch, and 2s and 1s switch. Equivalently, it sends each rank vector

Since we are not labeling voters in this example, we can only form a unique score-rank matrix by
fixing some ordering of the columns (instead of referring to specific voters). Ultimately, however, if
we are only interested in voting situations (i.e., for IAC-assumptions), the ordering of the columns
does not matter. In other words, as long we keep track of the number of votes for a given rank
vector (column), we can form various equivalent score-rank matrices.
17
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(column) in a score-rank matrix to its antipodal rank vector. For ℙ*, the antipodal map
takes Sℙ* and creates the new score-rank matrix
Sℙ∗′

𝟐
1
= 2
0
3

𝟐
2
0
1
3

𝟑
1
2
3
0

𝟏
3
2,
1
0

𝟐 𝟑
𝑠 𝑟
𝑝 𝑞
𝑟 𝑝
𝑞 𝑠

𝟏
𝑝
𝑞.
𝑟
𝑠

which in turn corresponds to the new elementary voting situation
𝟐
𝑠
∗′
ℙ = 𝑞
𝑝
𝑟

However, there is an easy way to see that this application of the antipodal map does not

correspond to any alternative permutation. By inspection, we see that in ℙ*, r gets ranked
1st twice, 2nd three times, and last 3 times; in ℙ*', meanwhile, no alternative gets ranked in

this way. Thus r cannot be permuted into any other alternative to produce ℙ*', although as
we said before, it is clear that ℙ* and ℙ*' are of the same type. Since we cannot always use
alternative permutations to obtain the antipodal map, which is just a reflection of the

permutahedron, we will define a new mechanism in the context of permutation matrices.
3.1d Weight type

In order to get from ℙ* to ℙ*' with permutation matrices, we have to introduce

some more definitions. For A = {a1, a2, …, am}, V = {v1, v2, …, vn}, and Borda scoring weights

w1, w2, . . . , wm (e.g., m - 1, m - 2, . . ., 0), we'll define a weight permutation πw: V V, written
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𝑤2
…
𝑤1
𝜋𝑤 = �𝜋(𝑤 ) 𝜋(𝑤 ) …
1
2

𝑤𝑚
𝜋(𝑤𝑚 )�,

as a permutation on the set of scoring weights. Therefore, the antipodal map πant is just a
special case of a weight permutation with π(3) = 0, π(2) = 1, π(1) = 2, and π(0) = 3.

A weight permutation matrix 𝑃𝜋𝑤 is the m x m square matrix
𝑃𝜋𝑤

𝑝1,1
⎡𝑝
2,1
= ⎢
⎢ ⋮
⎣𝑝𝑚,1

𝑝1,2
⋱

…

𝑝1,𝑚

⎤
⎥
⎥
𝑝𝑚,𝑚 ⎦

⋱

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝ℎ = 𝜋(𝑝𝑘 )
where 𝑝ℎ,𝑘 = �
. So for the antipodal map πant, we get
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑃𝜋𝑤

0
0
=�
0
1

0
0
1
0

0
1
0
0

…

𝑝1,𝑚

1
0
�.
0
0

We'll denote the product of a weight permutation matrix 𝑃𝜋𝑤 and a voting situation П as
𝑃𝜋𝑤

𝑝1,1
⎡𝑝
2,1
∗П= ⎢
⎢ ⋮
⎣𝑝𝑚,1

𝑝1,2
⋱

⋱

𝑎1,1
⎤ 𝑎
⎥ ∗ 2,1
⋮
⎥
𝑝𝑚,𝑚 ⎦ 𝑎𝑚,1

𝑎1,2
⋱

…
⋱

𝑎1,𝑛

𝑎𝑚,𝑛

,

where each ai,j is an alternative in the list form of the voting situation 18. Then
𝑎′1,1
𝑎′ 2,1
𝑃𝜋𝑤 ∗ П = П′ =
⋮
′
𝑎 𝑚,1

𝑎′1,2
⋱

…
⋱

𝑎′1,𝑛

𝑎′ 𝑚,𝑛

,

For repeated ballots, we can either list the repeated rank vectors separately in this matrix or just
keep track of which column in the matrix corresponds to more than one vote.
18
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where we multiply in standard matrix form such that (1)(ai,j) = a'i,j and all (0)(ai,j) are

ignored. For instance, with the antipodal map weight permutation and the voting situation
ℙ*, we get the product
0
0
�
0
1

which is just

0
0
1
0

0
1
0
0

1
0
�∗
0
0

𝑟
𝑝
𝑞
𝑠

𝑟
𝑝
𝑞
𝑠

𝑞
𝑟
𝑝
𝑠

𝑞
𝑟
𝑝
𝑠

𝑠
𝑝
𝑞
𝑟

𝑠
𝑝
𝑞
𝑟

𝟐
𝑠
∗′
𝑞
ℙ =
𝑝
𝑟

𝑠
𝑝
𝑞
𝑟

𝑠
𝑠
𝑟
𝑞
𝑞 = 𝑝
𝑝
𝑟

𝟐 𝟑
𝑠 𝑟
𝑝 𝑞
𝑟 𝑝
𝑞 𝑠

𝑠
𝑞
𝑝
𝑟

𝑠
𝑝
𝑟
𝑞

𝑠
𝑝
𝑟
𝑞

𝑟
𝑞
𝑝
𝑠

𝑟
𝑞
𝑝
𝑠

𝑟
𝑞
𝑝
𝑠

𝑝
𝑞
𝑟,
𝑠

𝟏
𝑝
𝑞.
𝑟
𝑠

Now let ℙ1, ℙ2 be any two voting situations with score-rank matrices S1 and S2,

respectively. Then we'll say ℙ1 and ℙ2 are of the same weight-type, or w-type, iff there
exists a weight permutation matrix 𝑃𝜋𝑤 ∈ 𝕄m x m such that 𝑃𝜋𝑤 ∗ ℙ1 = ℙ2 .
3.1e Connections between types

There are a couple of key observations that we can make now. Surprisingly (at least

to us at first), the set of all voting situations of the same a-type is not always equal to the set
of all voting situations of the same w-type. We have shown this in our most recent

example, where ℙ* and ℙ*' are of the same w-type, but not the same a-type. Furthermore,
alternative permutations always preserve centrality (i.e., if one voting situation is central,
then every other voting situation of the same a-type is also central). In contrast, w-type
permutations do not always preserve centrality, although we can easily show that the

antipodal map is a special case where centrality is always preserved. We also notice that
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even though we cannot get from ℙ* to ℙ*' by permuting individual alternatives, we can get
from ℙ* to ℙ*' by permuting entire rows of alternatives in the list form of the voting
situation, specifically, with the row permutation
1
4

𝜋𝑟 = �

2 3
3 2

4
�,
1

which switches the first and fourth rows, and the second and third rows of the voting

situation. Furthermore, while we can get from ℙ* to ℙ*' by permuting individual weights,
we cannot get from ℙ* to ℙ*' by permuting rows in the score-rank matrix. Further

inspection suggests that this contrast might be suggestive of a more general claim about
weight permutations corresponding to permuting rows of a voting situation, and

alternative permutations corresponding to permuting rows of a score-rank matrix.
Presently, we have not been able to prove or disprove this connection.

All of this begs the question, when are two voting situations of the same rr-type -

when can we be sure that one is simply a combination of reflections and rotations of the

other? At the moment, we conjecture that voting situations of the same alternative type are
always generated by some form of rotation, which would then make them of the same rrtype. But we know from the ℙ*/ℙ*' example that these are not sufficient to produce all
voting situations of the same rr-type. If our conjecture about alternative permutations

corresponding to rotations is true, then the reason for this is simple. While specific sets of
rank vectors (representing profiles/voting situations) can sometimes be mapped to their
antipodal coordinates with a permutation of alternatives, every point on the entire

permutahedron could only be rotated with an alternative permutation. Since rotations are
orientation preserving, alternative permutations do not result in reflections. Thus,
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obtaining all reflections would require the antipodal map. While we conjecture that all

profiles/voting situations generated by alternative permutations and the antipodal map

are of the same rr-type, we do not know if these sets are in fact equivalent. Are there some
voting situations that are of the same w-type, but are not antipodal maps of each other and

not of the same a-type, that nonetheless satisfy our general definition of rr-type? We

believe that future work directed at answering questions like these will not only aid us in

counting ties with combinatorial methods, but will also contribute to the general study of
profiles, voting situations, and the Borda count.

3.2 Searching for elementary profiles with Python
Besides classifying elementary voting situations (and voting situations in general),

we are also interested in counting elementary voting situations. With the help of Cornell
physics graduate Neil Sexton, we have used the computer language Python to develop

computer programs for counting elementary voting situations with different specified

numbers of voters for 4-candidate elections. We have attached a copy of the three versions
(we will explain the reason 3 versions shortly) of the code for 8 voters in Appendix IV.

Each program works by first listing all 24 permutations of standard Borda scoring

weights 3, 2, 1, and 0 as rank vectors. For a pre-determined n (number of voters), the
program checks which n sums of rank vectors yield the constant entries given by

Proposition 1. 4. 1. As an example for 8 voters, the program checks what combinations of 8

rank vectors sum to the vector (12, 12, 12, 12). The program then eliminates combinations

that contain smaller central voting situations in the reference ordering described in Section

3.0. When we actually run the program, it first prints the list of all m! possible rank vectors,
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followed by tuples containing the numbers on the list between 0 and m! - 1 which

correspond to rank vectors in an elementary voting situation. Finally, the program prints a
final count for the number of elementary voting situations. For instance, the output for 2
voters looks like

0 (0, 1, 2, 3)
1 (0, 1, 3, 2)
2 (0, 2, 1, 3)
3 (0, 2, 3, 1)
4 (0, 3, 1, 2)
5 (0, 3, 2, 1)
6 (1, 0, 2, 3)
7 (1, 0, 3, 2)
8 (1, 2, 0, 3)
9 (1, 2, 3, 0)
10 (1, 3, 0, 2)
11 (1, 3, 2, 0)
12 (2, 0, 1, 3)
13 (2, 0, 3, 1)
14 (2, 1, 0, 3)
15 (2, 1, 3, 0)
16 (2, 3, 0, 1)
17 (2, 3, 1, 0)
18 (3, 0, 1, 2)
19 (3, 0, 2, 1)
20 (3, 1, 0, 2)
21 (3, 1, 2, 0)
22 (3, 2, 0, 1)
23 (3, 2, 1, 0)

{(1, 22), (4, 19), (5, 18), (2, 21), (3, 20), (7, 16), (8, 15), (9, 14), (6, 17), (11, 12), (10, 13), (0, 23)}
The number of elementary voting situations for 2 voters is 12

In this way, we counted the number of elementary voting situations for m = 4 and n

≤ 12. By adding an extra condition into the code, we also counted the number of

elementary voting situations with no repeated ballots for m = 4 and n ≤ 12. Finally, by

taking out the conditions that eliminate smaller central voting situations in the ordering,
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we counted the total number of central voting situations for m = 4 and n ≤ 12. Our results
are shown below in Table 3.2.

n
all central voting
situations
all elementary
voting situations
elementary voting
situations with nonrepeating ballots

2

4

6

8

10

12

12

114

1328

12981

100476

638126

12

36

220

96

0

0

12

36

532

2076

5664

5720

Table 2. Number of central voting situations, and number of elementary
voting situations with and without repeated ballots for m = 4 and n ≤ 12.

As seen in the table, there are no elementary voting situations with repeated ballots

for 2 voters and 4 voters. The number of voting situations with no ballot cast more than
once peaks at 220 for 6 voters, before dropping to 96 for 8 voters and 0 for 10 or more

voters. Meanwhile, the number of central voting situations appears to increase by roughly
an order of magnitude per two voters (at least until n = 10). While we do not present it

here, Zwicker has used Ramsey theory to show that there is an upper bound on the number
of elementary voting situations for a given number of alternatives.

In the future, when we fully describe voting situations of the same rr-type in the

context of alternative and weight permutations, we hope to count the number of different
rr-types for a given number of voters by building these conditions into the program. We
already know by inspection that there is only 1 rr-type for 2-voter elementary voting
situations (reversals, Figure 18 in Section 3.1), and there are 3 rr-types for 4-voter

elementary voting situations, all of which are shown in Appendix II.
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We also note that the utility and efficiency of our program is limited by the skill of

the programmer (the author) and time. In the future, a skilled programmer can likely

merge separate codes for different numbers of voters, so that a user-friendly command can

determine which n the user is interested in at the moment of running the code.
3.3 Conclusions and future work

The shift from 3-candidate to 4-candidate elections corresponds an enormous increase in
the complexity of the problem of determining the probability of getting an all-way tie in the
Borda count. The complexity of this problem has so far hindered four different approaches at
solving it: one aimed at getting an exact IC-probability function, one trying to derive an
approximate IC-probability function, and two different methods meant to obtain a quasipolynomial expression for counting ties under IAC assumptions.
Fifteen years ago, Marchant [4, 5] used the theory of random walks - relevant to the study
of magnetic properties of crystals - to obtain an expression for the IC-probability of an election
resulting in a 3-way Borda tie between 3 candidates as a function of n, the number of voters. He
then use Fourier transforms and lattice Green's functions to derive a formula that approximated
the IC-probability of a 3-way Borda tie between 3 candidates, and found that the results from his
two formulas were similar for n ≥ 10. However, due to the complexity of the problem, Marchant
was neither able to find an exact formula using random walks, nor an approximate formula using
lattice Green's functions, for 4-way Borda ties between 4 voters.
In 2008, Dai and Zwicker [2, 9] used two approaches, Ehrhart theory and 'brute force'
combinatorial methods, to get a quasi-polynomial expression counting the total number of voting
situations, assuming IAC, which produce 3-way Borda ties between 3-candidates as a function of
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n. For the Ehrhart theory approach, they modeled the conditions for a 3-way Borda tie as a
system of linear constraints, and used computer software to enumerate the total number of
integer points within the polytope bounded by these constraints. For their combinatorial
approach, they counted the total number of central voting situations for m = 3 as special linear
combinations of elementary voting situations. However, the limits of computing power meant
that they could not extend the Ehrhart theory approach to 4-way Borda ties between 4 candidates.
In the spirit of our predecessors, our research has been both theoretical and
computational. On the theoretical side, we have classified different versions of 'type' based on
different kinds of permutations. While we were unsuccessful in extending Dai's combinatorial
approach to 4 candidates, we found some interesting connections between rank vector
representations of profiles/voting situations on the 4-permutahedron. We believe that an
understanding of the connections between different types of profiles/voting situations may point
future 'brute force' combinatorial efforts in the right direction. On the computational side, we
have written computer programs that count the number of central and elementary voting
situations for m = 4 and n ≤ 12. As computing power (and programming aptitude!) increases,
these programs have the potential to extend our understanding of type even beyond m = 4.
The ultimate prize in this field would be finding a general theorem that gives the total
number of all-way Borda ties as a function of both m, the number of candidates, and n, the
number of voters (we're interested in IAC assumptions, but the utility of such an expression for
an IC probability distribution would be equally profound). Whether such an all-encompassing
formula even exists is unknown. What is known, however, is that there is still much work to be
done on the problem of counting all-way Borda ties. We hope that our review and research will
aid and inspire future efforts.
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Appendix I:
Marchant's Monte Carlo approximations of IC-probabilities for all-way Borda ties [4].
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Appendix II: Color-coded elementary voting situations on the 4-Permutahedron for n = 4.
Appendix IIa
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Appendix IIb
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Appendix IIc
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Appendix III: Voter permutations, voter permutation matrices, and voter type

We can use matrices to formally define the relationship between profiles and voting

situations. For a set of alternatives A = {a1, a2, …, am} and a set of voters V = {v1, v2, …, vn},

we'll define a voter permutation πv: V V, written

𝑣2
…
𝑣𝑛
𝑣1
𝜋𝑣 = �𝜋(𝑣 ) 𝜋(𝑣 ) … 𝜋(𝑣 )�,
1
2
𝑛

as a permutation on the set of voters. Then a voter permutation matrix 𝑃𝜋𝑣 is the n x n

square matrix

𝑝1,1
⎡𝑝
2,1
𝑃𝜋𝑣 = ⎢
⎢ ⋮
⎣𝑝𝑛,1

𝑝1,2
⋱

…
⋱

𝑝1,𝑛

⎤
⎥
⎥
𝑝𝑛,𝑛 ⎦

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑣ℎ = 𝜋(𝑣𝑘 )
where 𝑝ℎ,𝑘 = �
. We can now state the following definition:
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Let ℙ1, ℙ2 be any two profiles with score-rank matrices S1 and S2, respectively. Then

we'll say ℙ1 and ℙ2 are the same voting situation iff there exists a voter permutation matrix

𝑃𝜋𝑣 ∈ 𝕄n x n such that S1 𝑃𝜋𝑣 = S2. For instance, consider the profile ℙ from example in
Section 3.1b,

𝑣1
𝑎1
ℙ = 𝑎2
𝑎3
𝑎4

𝑣2
𝑎2
𝑎1
𝑎4
𝑎3
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𝑣3
𝑎3
𝑎4
𝑎2
𝑎1

𝑣4
𝑎4
𝑎3 ,
𝑎1
𝑎2

𝑣1
with the voter permutation 𝜋𝑣 = �𝑣
4

𝑣2
𝑣2

𝑣3
𝑣1

𝑣4
𝑣3 �. So for the voter permutation matrix,

we see that p1,3 = 1, p2,2 = 1, p3,4 = 1, p4,1 =1, and all other entries are 0. Thus we compute
3
2
S1 𝑃𝜋𝑣 = �
1
0

2
3
0
1

0
1
3
2

This corresponds to the new profile,

1 0
0 0
��
2 0
3 1

𝑣1
𝑎4
ℙ′ = 𝑎3
𝑎1
𝑎2

0
1
0
0

1
0
0
0

𝑣2
𝑎2
𝑎1
𝑎4
𝑎3

𝑣3
𝑎1
𝑎2
𝑎3
𝑎4

0
1
0
0
�=�
1
2
0
3
𝑣4
𝑎3
𝑎4 ,
𝑎2
𝑎1

2
3
0
1

3
2
1
0

0
1
�.
3
2

and it is easy to show that ℙ and ℙ' are the same voting situation in tuple form.

88

Appendix IV: the Computer Code
For purposes of brevity, we will only present three versions of the code: one which

counts elementary voting situations for n = 8 (Appendix IVa), one which counts elementary
voting situations with no repeated ballots for n = 8 (Appendix IVb), and one which counts

central voting situations for n = 8 (Appendix IVc). Equivalent versions of the code for other
values of n may be obtained by modifying the conditions.
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Appendix IVa: All elementary voting situations for n = 8.
#This program counts the total number of elementary voting situations for 8 voters.
import itertools
import operator

elementary = []
k = list(itertools.permutations(range(4)))
for index, x in enumerate(k):
print(index, x)

def tuple_sum(k,*args):
t_sum = (0,)*len(k[0])
for a in args:
t_sum = tuple(map(operator.add, t_sum, k[a]))
return t_sum
def idx_sum_not(not_val, *args):

for a in range(len(args)-1):
for b in range(a+1, len(args)):
if args[a]+args[b] == not_val:
return False
return True

for i in range(len(k)):
for j in range(i,len(k)):
for l in range(j,len(k)):
for m in range(l,len(k)):
for n in range (m,len(k)):
for o in range (n,len(k)):
for p in range (o,len(k)):
for q in range (p,len(k)):
if tuple_sum(k,i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q) == (12, 12, 12, 12)\
and idx_sum_not(23, i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q)\ #do not count voting situations that contain reversals
and set(tuple(itertools.permutations([i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q], 4))).isdisjoint(set(((5, 7, 14, 23),\
#do not count voting situations that countain 4-voter elementary voting situations
(4, 8, 13, 21),(4, 12, 13, 17),(0, 7, 17, 22),(1, 4, 18, 23),(0, 11, 14, 21),(4, 7, 17, 18),(3, 8, 13, 22),\
(3, 10, 12, 21),(2, 11, 13, 20),(7, 8, 9, 22),(7, 10, 11, 18),(2, 3, 18, 23),(1, 10, 15, 20),(5, 6, 16, 19),\
(1, 4, 20, 21),(2, 9, 12, 23),(1, 8, 17, 19),(6, 8, 11, 21),(2, 3, 19, 22),(0, 9, 16, 18),(0, 14, 15, 17),\
(0, 5, 19, 22),(1, 6, 16, 23),(5, 9, 12, 20),(2, 12, 15, 17),(4, 6, 15, 22),(3, 11, 14, 18),(7, 9, 10, 20),\
(0, 5, 20, 21),(6, 8, 9, 23),(2, 10, 15, 19),(3, 13, 14, 16),(5, 12, 13, 16),(1, 14, 15, 16),(6, 10, 11, 19)))):
elementary.append((i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q))
elementary_unique = set(tuple(sorted(t)) for t in elementary)
print(elementary_unique)
print("The #of elementary voting situations for n = 8 is", len(elementary_unique))
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Appendix IVb: All elementary voting situations with no repeated ballots for n = 8.

#This program counts the total number of elementary voting situations with no repeated ballots for 8 voters.
import itertools
import operator

elementary = []
k = list(itertools.permutations(range(4)))
for index, x in enumerate(k):
print(index, x)

def tuple_sum(k,*args):
t_sum = (0,)*len(k[0])
for a in args:
t_sum = tuple(map(operator.add, t_sum, k[a]))
return t_sum
def idx_sum_not(not_val, *args):

for a in range(len(args)-1):
for b in range(a+1, len(args)):
if args[a]+args[b] == not_val:
return False
return True

for i in range(len(k)):
for j in range(i+1,len(k)):
for l in range(j+1,len(k)):
for m in range(l+1,len(k)):
for n in range (m+1,len(k)):
for o in range (n+1,len(k)):
for p in range (o+1,len(k)):
for q in range (p+1,len(k)):
if tuple_sum(k,i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q)\
== (12, 12, 12, 12)\
and idx_sum_not(23, i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q)\ #do not count voting situations that contain reversals
and set(tuple(itertools.permutations([i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q], 4))).isdisjoint(set(((5, 7, 14, 23),\
#do not count voting situations that countain 4-voter elementary voting situations
(4, 8, 13, 21),(4, 12, 13, 17),(0, 7, 17, 22),(1, 4, 18, 23),(0, 11, 14, 21),(4, 7, 17, 18),(3, 8, 13, 22),\
(3, 10, 12, 21),(2, 11, 13, 20),(7, 8, 9, 22),(7, 10, 11, 18),(2, 3, 18, 23),(1, 10, 15, 20),(5, 6, 16, 19),\
(1, 4, 20, 21),(2, 9, 12, 23),(1, 8, 17, 19),(6, 8, 11, 21),(2, 3, 19, 22),(0, 9, 16, 18),(0, 14, 15, 17),\
(0, 5, 19, 22),(1, 6, 16, 23),(5, 9, 12, 20),(2, 12, 15, 17),(4, 6, 15, 22),(3, 11, 14, 18),(7, 9, 10, 20),\
(0, 5, 20, 21),(6, 8, 9, 23),(2, 10, 15, 19),(3, 13, 14, 16),(5, 12, 13, 16),(1, 14, 15, 16),(6, 10, 11, 19))))\
and i != j != l != m != n != o != p != q: #do not include repeated ballots
elementary.append((i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q))
elementary_unique = set(tuple(sorted(t)) for t in elementary)
print(elementary_unique)
print("The # of elementary voting situations with no repeated ballots for n = 8 is", len(elementary_unique))
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Appendix IVc: All central voting situations for n = 8.
#This program counts the total number of central voting situations for 8 voters.
import itertools
import operator

elementary = []
k = list(itertools.permutations(range(4)))
for index, x in enumerate(k):
print(index, x)

def tuple_sum(k,*args):
t_sum = (0,)*len(k[0])
for a in args:
t_sum = tuple(map(operator.add, t_sum, k[a]))
return t_sum
def idx_sum_not(not_val, *args):

for a in range(len(args)-1):
for b in range(a+1, len(args)):
if args[a]+args[b] == not_val:
return False
return True

for i in range(len(k)):
for j in range(i,len(k)):
for l in range(j,len(k)):
for m in range(l,len(k)):
for n in range (m,len(k)):
for o in range (n,len(k)):
for p in range (o,len(k)):
for q in range (p,len(k)):
if tuple_sum(k,i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q) == (12, 12, 12, 12):
elementary.append((i,j,l,m,n,o,p,q))
elementary_unique = set(tuple(sorted(t)) for t in elementary)
print(elementary_unique)
print("The # of central voting situations for n = 8 is", len(elementary_unique))
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